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Abstract
In this study I analyze the implications of contractual innovation in vertically-
separated industries, using the example of the video rental industry. Prior to 1998,
video stores obtained inventory from movie distributors using simple linear pricing con-
tracts. In 1998, revenue-sharing contracts, which include inventory restrictions, were
widely adopted. I investigate the eect of using revenue-sharing contracts on rms'
prots and consumer welfare, relative to linear pricing contracts. I analyze a new panel
dataset of home video retailers that includes information on individual retailers' con-
tract and inventory choices, weekly rentals and sales, and contract terms (prices and
quantity restrictions) for 1,114 movie titles and 6,594 retailers in the U.S during each
week of 1998 and 1999. A structural econometric model of rms' behavior is developed
and estimated, and counterfactual experiments are performed. The results indicate that
total upstream and downstream prots increase by three to six percent, and consumers
benet substantially when revenue-sharing contracts are adopted. I also examine the
eects of the observed quantity restrictions. I nd that these restrictions serve to in-
crease prots for upstream rms and decrease prots for downstream rms, relative to
revenue-sharing contracts without inventory restrictions.
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Coordinating inventory decisions between manufacturers and retailers can be a challenge
in industries where both rms are separately maximizing prots. In particular, conditions
in the retail market may cause output to be reduced below the level that would be chosen
by a vertically-integrated rm. Revenue-sharing contracts, in which the retailer pays the
manufacturer a fee per unit of inventory and a percentage of the revenue generated from
the inventory, allow rms greater 
exibility for solving this problem than simple linear
pricing (that is, a xed fee per unit of inventory only). This study examines the eect
of the recent widespread adoption of revenue-sharing contracts in the vertically-separated
video rental industry. I present a theoretical model of rm behavior and consumer demand
that incorporates the institutional details of the contracting environment, including the
presence of inventory restrictions in revenue-sharing contracts. The structural model is
estimated using a new dataset on video retailers in the US. Using the estimated demand
system, I conduct counter-factual experiments to analyze the implications of the adoption
of revenue-sharing contracts in this industry, including the use of inventory restrictions.
Prior to 1998, video stores obtained inventory from movie distributors using xed-fee
contracts, consisting of a single wholesale price per unit of inventory (typically around
$65 per tape). In 1998, revenue-sharing contracts, consisting of an upfront fee per unit
of inventory and a revenue split paid on the basis of rental revenue, were widely adopted
by the largest chains in the industry. These contracts typically charge between $0 and
$8 per unit of inventory with the retailer keeping between 40 and 60 percent of rental
revenues. Movie distributors and the large chains (most notably Blockbuster, Inc.) directly
negotiate revenue-sharing agreements covering most titles distributed by the upstream rm.1
Smaller chains and independent retailers do not have access to directly negotiate such
bilateral agreements. However, a third party aggregates the demand of these independent
retailers and negotiates and monitors revenue-sharing agreements with movie distributors on
their behalf. Retailers participate by paying a relatively small sign-up fee and purchasing
the necessary computer and modem technology. Although the bilateral revenue-sharing
agreements between the distributors and the largest chains usually apply to all \rental-
1Parts of Blockbuster's revenue-sharing contracts were led as part of the rm's September, 1999 initial
public oering on the New York Stock Exchange. The rst contract is dated November 1997, and four
similar contracts follow in the spring of 1998. These contracts may be viewed at http://www.freeedgar.com.
1priced" titles released by the distributor, the contracts available to independent retailers
allow retailers to choose between revenue-sharing and xed-fee terms on a title-by-title basis.
Empirically, retailers choose revenue-sharing terms for approximately half of all movie titles
for which both xed-fee and revenue-sharing terms are oered, excluding direct-to-video
releases.
When choosing a contract for a title, retailers each face the same price under xed-fee
terms, and also face the same upfront fee and revenue split under revenue-sharing terms.
No inventory restrictions apply to xed-fee contracts, but the upstream rm can and does
set inventory restrictions as part of the revenue-sharing contracts. Furthermore, while
xed-fee prices, upfront fees and revenue splits tend to vary only across three broad box-
oce categories, inventory restrictions vary across products within box-oce categories, and
across store size. Stores must adhere to both minimum and maximum inventory restrictions
in order to participate in revenue-sharing agreements. These inventory restrictions are often
binding for retailers: 37 percent of titles on revenue-sharing are purchased at the minimum
inventory level, and 7 percent of titles are purchased at the maximum level.
The typical analysis of revenue sharing in vertically-separated markets focuses on the
usefulness of this contract for alleviating understocking or double-marginalization problems
that may exist under xed-fee contracts.2 Thus, the existence of both inventory minimums
and maximums, and the fact that these restrictions are so often binding, presents a puzzle
for the standard analysis. Inventory minimums and maximums are the only terms in the
contract that vary across retailers for a given movie, suggesting that these terms play an
important role in discriminating between downstream rms. I develop a theoretical model
of rm behavior that incorporates the details of the institutional setting and rationalizes
the use of inventory restrictions. Multiple, heterogeneous downstream markets exist, which
dier in both their demand conditions and their competitive conditions. In the presence of
such heterogeneous downstream markets, the upstream rm would like to charge dierent
prices to retailers located in dierent markets, but is constrained to oer the same upfront
fees and revenue-splits to all retailers. Inventory restrictions help the upstream rm to
2See, for example, Dana and Spier (2001) and Cachon and Lariviere (2000), which both examine revenue-
sharing contracts in the video rental industry. Other issues addressed in the empirical literature on the
determinants of contractual form include issues concerning moral hazard (for example, Shepard (1993),
Slade (1996), Lafontaine (1992) and Corts (1999)), and the eects of transactions costs and the role of risk
(for example, Allen and Leuck (1993, 1992)). For a summary of the empirical literature on contractual
relations between manufacturers and retailers, see Lafontaine and Slade (1997).
2accomplish some of this discrimination be setting quantity restrictions instead. The model
oers specic predictions linking retailers' contract and inventory choices to the competitive
conditions and demand conditions in their market.
The empirical model uses observed variation in rms' competitive conditions and con-
tract and inventory choices across dierent geographic markets and products to identify the
expected demand conditions facing each rm. I employ a new dataset that includes infor-
mation on individual retailers' contract and inventory choices, weekly rentals and sales, and
contract terms (prices and quantity restrictions) for 1,114 movie titles for 6,594 retailers in
the U.S during the 104-week period from 1998 through 1999. I observe all retailers that have
used a revenue-sharing contract at least once between July, 1997 and December, 1999, with
the exception of Blockbuster Video and Hollywood Video. The included rms represent
approximately 30 percent of all U.S. video rental retailers. Using these data, I estimate the
structural model to generate predicted demand conditions.
Based on the estimated demand conditions, I conduct several counter-factual experi-
ments. The results of these experiments indicate that total upstream and downstream prof-
its increase by approximately three to six percent and consumers benet substantially when
revenue-sharing contracts are adopted. Empirically, small retailers adopt these contracts
more extensively than large retailers, and I estimate that the benets to small retailers from
this contractual form are more substantial than the gains to large retailers.3 I also examine
the eects of inventory restrictions. I nd that these restrictions serve to increase prots
for upstream rms and decrease prots for downstream rms, relative to revenue-sharing
contracts without quantity restrictions.
This paper complements two previous theoretical studies that have examined the adop-
tion of revenue-sharing in the video rental industry. Dana and Spier (2001) consider the
usefulness of revenue-sharing with perfectly competitive retailers in a single downstream
market under two sets of demand conditions. In the rst case, demand is uncertain and
prices are sticky. In the second case, demand is known but declining in a predictable way
over time, and prices are 
exible. The authors derive optimal revenue-sharing terms, which
dier according to the assumed demand conditions. The paper is motivated by the contracts
between Blockbuster Video and several major studios, in which Blockbuster Video agrees
to accept all titles under revenue-sharing terms. Thus it is reasonable that an implication of
3For example, I predict that prots of the smallest retailers increase by approximately nine percent, while
those of the largest retailers increase by only three percent for one class of movie titles.
3their study is that both upstream and downstream rms will prefer revenue-sharing terms
to xed-fee terms for all titles. In another paper, Cachon and Lariviere (2000) compare rev-
enue sharing to other methods of coordinating inventory in vertically-separated industries,
such as buy-back and quantity-
exibility contracts. They also consider two possibilities in
which revenue-sharing may not work as well. First, they conjecture that administrative
costs may prove too high to implement revenue-sharing in some settings. Second, they note
that the increased potential for reduced sales eort under revenue-sharing terms may make
revenue-sharing a poor contractual form in some industries. Neither of these issues seems
critical to the video rental industry, and the authors identify the video rental industry as a
prime candidate for the successful use of revenue-sharing contracts.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. First, I discuss some of the institutional
details of the video rental industry. Section 3 describes the data used in the analysis and
summarizes the data. The theoretical model of rm behavior is presented in section 4, along
with a discussion of alternative specications in section 5. The estimation methodology is
described in section 6. Section 7 provides results from the estimation procedures, and
section 8 presents the results of counter-factual experiments. The nal two sections present
results of various robustness tests and conclude.
2 The Home Video Industry and Contract Forms
The home video industry grew quickly throughout the 1980's to become the largest source
of domestic revenue for movie studios.4 In 1999, the $16 billion industry accounted for
55% of studios' domestic revenues, compared to 22% generated by theatrical revenues, and
23% from all other forms of media, such as the sales of pay-per-view, cable, and broadcast
television rights. Currently, there are approximately 20,000 home video retailer outlets.
These outlets are split evenly between independently-owned small chains of retailer locations
and large chains of several hundred stores, such as Blockbuster, Inc. and Hollywood Video.5
The traditional method of distributing motion pictures on videocassette occurs via a
xed-fee transfer in the form of a linear price paid to the distribution arm of a movie studio
by home video retailers.6 Price typically does not vary by title, with distributors typically
4VSDA white paper, 1996, pg. 12.
5VSDA 1998 and 1999 annual reports. Revenue splits reported in 1998 annual report, pg. 18.
6The distribution arm of a movie studio is the upstream rm in this context. For the remainder of the
paper, I refer to the upstream rm as the distributor.
4charging between $65 and $70 per tape, regardless of the identity of the movie.7 According
to industry sources, the marginal cost of producing, packaging and shipping a pre-recorded
videocassette tape is around two dollars.
In addition to this traditional xed-fee or linear pricing, revenue-sharing contracts have
existed for about ten years, but were only used on a very small scale until recently. In
1998, revenue-sharing became a widely-used contractual arrangement for both large chains
and independent stores. The distributor typically negotiates revenue-sharing contracts sep-
arately with large chains, such as Blockbuster, Inc., and with Rentrak, which is a private
company that administers revenue-sharing arrangements for a large clientele of smaller
chains and independent video rental outlets. Blockbuster, Inc. initially proposed revenue-
sharing agreements to the major distributors in late 1997. Other retail rms soon followed
Blockbuster's lead, signing up with Rentrak in large numbers throughout 1998. Although
Blockbuster reported that revenue sharing accounted for 90 percent of their revenue in 2000,
the typical independent retailer reports using revenue-sharing terms through Rentrak for
roughly 28 percent of titles, and 25 percent of revenue.8
Under the typical revenue-sharing arrangement, the retailer pays an upfront fee of $3
to $8 per unit of inventory. In return, the retailer must share rental receipts with the
distributor, and adhere to inventory restrictions. For movies with large theatrical box-oce
receipts, the retailer retains about 45 percent of rental revenue, and receives some portion
of the eventual sale of the pre-viewed cassette. Although the upfront fee and revenue-splits
vary across three broad box-oce categories, they do not vary by title.9 Retailers must
choose between xed-fee and revenue-sharing terms for a given title before it is released on
video. Once the retailer chooses a contractual form, she must accept the same contractual
form for all tapes purchased for that title. Thus, the retailer makes two decisions for
each title: rst, she chooses a contract form. Second, she chooses the number of tapes to
purchase. This inventory choice may be constrained under revenue-sharing terms. I discuss
the nature of these restrictions in greater detail later.
7Exceptions to this rule are titles priced for \sell-through." In this case, titles are priced to encourage
direct sales to consumers, and price does vary by title. Prices obtained through interviews with studio
executives. Other volume discounts or price breaks through \copy-depth" programs may apply. Such copy-
depth programs were most widely used in 2000, and were less common in 1998 and 1999. I do not observe
these discounts, and assume that retailers pay the full wholesale price before discounts.
8Blockbuster, Inc. data reported in Weekly Variety, October 12-18 1998, p. 18. Rentrak gures compiled
by author.
9The only observed variation in these fees that exists within a box-oce category is variation across
distributors.
5Distributors also face some restrictions when setting contractual terms. Anti-trust con-
cerns prevent distributors from oering dierent prices to dierent buyers. Section 2 of
the Clayton Act, as amended by the 1936 Robinson-Patman Act, makes price discrimina-
tion of this type illegal. Note that the Robinson-Patman Act does not, however, speak to
quantity requirements in any way. For this reason, I assume that the upstream rm must
oer the same contractual terms (wholesale prices, upfront fees, and revenue-splits) to all
downstream retailers. This assumption is borne out empirically.
In addition to setting contractual terms, the distributor can in theory choose whether or
not to oer both contractual forms. In particular, one might expect that the upstream rm
might choose to only oer revenue-sharing terms, since revenue sharing is a more 
exible
contractual arrangement. However, revenue sharing requires extensive computer monitoring
of millions of transactions. As recent technological advances have made revenue-sharing a
feasible contractual option, both upstream and downstream rms have widely adopted
these contracts and approximately 10,000 rms had access to revenue-sharing contracts in
2000.10 However, the remaining 10,000 retailers in the industry are either not technologically
equipped to participate in this form of distribution, or may not qualify for credit terms with
Rentrak. Thus, if xed-fee contracts are withdrawn, distributors lose access to half of all
retail outlets, and may also face potential foreclosure charges for excluding retailers from
acquiring inventory. One might expect that the upstream rm would therefore restrict xed-
fee contracts to downstream rms that do not have the ability to participate in revenue-
sharing contracts. This is not possible because the Copyright Act of 1976 states that the
owner of a lawful copy can \sell or otherwise dispose of" the copy. This is commonly
referred to as the Right of First Sale Doctrine, and allows the owner of a lawful copy to
rent, lease, lend or resell a legally owned copy of a work. Thus, retailers with the ability
to participate in revenue-sharing agreements cannot be excluded from choosing xed-fee
terms when ordering inventory for particular titles (although they are limited to a single
contractual form for any given title). Thus, downstream rms can discipline the upstream
rm by opting to take xed-fee terms when revenue-sharing splits are not satisfactory.
Finally, the empirical evidence before and after the introduction of revenue sharing suggests
that xed-fee terms continue to be oered to all rms, and that xed-fee prices do not change
after the introduction of revenue sharing.
10Stores using Rentrak account for over 6,000 stores, with an additional 4,000 stores belonging to Block-
buster, Inc. and other large chains also wired for revenue sharing.
63 Motivation and Data Summary
In this section, I describe a new dataset on rms in the video rental industry. This de-
scription is followed by some summary statistics on revenue-sharing and xed-fee contracts,
paying attention to dierences in rms' choices and outcomes across the two contractual
forms.
3.1 Data Description
The data for this study are provided by Rentrak Corporation. The use of revenue-sharing
contracts requires extensive computer monitoring of transactions in order to enforce the
revenue-sharing payments. Independent retailers, as well as many large retail chains, rely
on Rentrak as a central source for the provision of these monitoring services. Rentrak
also negotiates contractual terms with upstream rms on their clients' behalf. Over 10,000
retailers used Rentrak between 1998 and 1999, accounting for over half of all retailers in the
industry. Blockbuster Video and Hollywood Video comprise about 4,000 of these retailers,
and I do not observe their transactions.11 I observe 6,594 retailers, ranging in size from
single-store locations to a chain with 1,147 locations. Of these 6,594 retail locations, I am
able to match 5,895 stores with local demographic and phone book data.
For these 5,895 stores, I observe transaction data for 104 weeks between January, 1998
and December, 1999. These stores represent about 30 percent of all stores in the industry.
I discard observations for titles released after July 1999, so that rental activity for each title
is tracked for at least 6 months. The data may be organized according to the frequency
with which I observe each variable. At the store level, I observe location at the county,
zip code, and Designated Market Area (DMA) level.12 I observe total annual and monthly
store revenue, and the size of a store's chain. Total monthly store revenue is broken out
among rentals and sales for adult, game, DVD, and regular titles. I also observe the date
the store joined the Rentrak database, and the date the store left Rentrak, if applicable.
Entry into the database is common over the two-year period, and typically represents the
choice of an existing retailer to join Rentrak, rather than entry into the industry. The vast
majority of store exits (over 90 percent) represent store closure, or exit from the industry.
11Blockbuster Video does not release their data, and only process some titles through Rentrak's system.
Hollywood Video recently settled a lawsuit with Rentrak involving a dispute over data integrity.
12Designated Market Areas organize the United States according to the coverage areas of broadcast tele-
vision.
7For each title, I observe the number of titles released in the same month under dierent
contract types, and a box-oce category. The box-oce categories are denoted as A, B, C,
or D. Titles in the A category have theatrical box-oce revenues of more than $40 million,
and titles in the B and C categories have theatrical box-oce revenues of $15 - $40 million
and $1 - $15 million, respectively. Titles in the D category do not have a theatrical release,
and are \direct-to-video" titles, such as instructional or exercise videos. Many of the D titles
are only bought by a single retailer, and I exclude these titles in the analysis. The dataset
includes a total of 74 A titles, 72 B titles, and 1,312 C titles. The analysis is conducted
using the 1,114 A, B, or C titles in the data that oered both revenue-sharing and xed-fee
pricing contracts. According to their box oce classications, 23 of these titles are A titles,
35 are B titles, and 1,056 are C titles.
At the store-title level, I observe the type of contract chosen by the retailer (when
more than one option is available) and the number of tapes purchased.13 Transactions are
recorded weekly for each store-title combination. Thus, transactions data are store-title-
week triples. These data provide average weekly prices and total weekly quantities of rental
transactions for all titles over the two year period. The same information is provided for
the sales of each title.
The Rentrak dataset is an especially rich source of information on rm behavior. How-
ever, Rentrak cannot provide information on local competitive conditions facing each store
in the database. In order to observe (or at least proxy) for local competitive conditions, I use
Yellow Pages listings for all video retail stores in the United States, including Blockbuster
stores, for 1998 and 1999. From these data, I identify the number of competing video retail
stores (and the number of Blockbuster stores separately) within the same zip code of each
observed store in the Rentrak database. This additional information helps to distinguish
between the competitive conditions facing dierent observed retailers. Finally, I utilize US
Census data on the demographic characteristics of each zip code. Demographic data include
the number of people, median income, and marginal distributions of race, education, age,
gender, employment, family status, and the level of urbanization in each zip code. These
three data sources are merged by zip code. When estimating the model, I dene a local
market as a zip code area and use the merged data to characterize local market conditions.
Clearly, zip code areas are designed to provide convenient local areas for the purposes of
13Fixed-fee contracts are oered on all titles, although some distributors do not oer revenue-sharing terms
until after 1999. Titles for which only xed-fee terms are oered are not currently used in the analysis.
8delivering mail, rather than as denitions of local markets. However, zip code areas appear
to be a reasonable demarcation between markets in this setting: the average zip code area
contains approximately 24,000 people and 2.6 video retail stores. Larger areas, such as
4-digit zip code areas or Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSA's) are also feasible ways of
attaching local demographic and business listing information, but clearly seem too large a
market for most video store customers.
3.2 Summary Statistics
Tables 1 - 3 and 4 - 6 examine dierences between titles taken by stores on revenue-sharing
versus xed-fee contracts for A, B, and C titles, respectively. Tables 1 - 3 examine dierences
between stores that choose dierent pricing contracts for the same title. Tables 4 - 6 examine
dierences between titles on xed-fee versus revenue-sharing terms within a store.
Dierences Between Stores for the Same Title
The rst panel of Tables 1 - 3 shows dierences in store and market characteristics
between stores accepting xed-fee contracts and stores accepting revenue-sharing contracts
for the same title. Table 1 provides information for the 23 A titles released during 1998
and 1999 for which stores had a choice of contract. Tables 2 - 3 provide information for the
35 B titles and 1,056 C titles respectively. Stores accepting xed-fee contracts tend to be
correlated with demographic variables associated with higher levels of rental demand. For
example, stores on xed-fee contracts tend to be located in zip code areas with slightly larger
populations and fewer households that consist of a married couple with children, which is a
less active rental population. Dierences in demographics are not strongly signicant across
the two groups of stores, although the dierence is positive for all demographic variables
associated with more active demand for video renting (and negative for `Percent Married
with Children'), and consistent across all three categories of titles.
Competitive conditions do not dier signicantly, except in the case of B titles, where
stores accepting xed-fee contracts tend to face fewer competitors. There are no signicant
dierences in the presence of competing Blockbuster retailers between the groups of stores.14
Store size diers signicantly between the two groups. Stores choosing revenue-sharing are
signicantly smaller than those accepting xed-fee, and they carry a greater variety of
14However, stores facing competiton from a Blockbuster Video retailer are more likely to face binding
maximum quantity constraints and are less likely to face binding minimum quantity constraints.
9titles. Other characteristics of the stores, such as stores' overall mix of business across
rentals of \normal" titles, rentals of adult titles or video games, or sales of tapes, do not
dier signicantly across contract choice, with the exception that stores accepting revenue-
sharing contracts on B titles are more likely to generate signicant revenues from rentals of
adult titles.15
The second panel of Tables 1 - 3 shows dierences in inventories, rental activity, and
prots for the two groups of stores. Inventories are signicantly dierent between the two
groups. Stores choosing revenue-sharing contracts purchase approximately twice as much
inventory as their xed-fee counterparts for the same title. However, rental activity is not
signicantly dierent despite the larger inventory levels. Neither retailer nor distributor
prots are signicantly dierent between the two groups of stores, except in the case of C
titles, where retailers actually appear to be losing money on average under xed-fee terms,
and distributors appear to be better o under xed-fee terms.
Dierences Between Titles Within a Store
Table 4 provides information on the A titles taken by each store. Tables 5 and 6 provide
information for the B and C titles taken by the stores, respectively. The rst panel of Tables
4 - 6 shows dierences in the revenue-sharing contract terms for titles taken under xed-fee
terms, and titles taken under revenue-sharing terms within each store. If a revenue-sharing
contract is taken by the retailer, these are the actual terms of the contract. If a xed-fee
contract is accepted, then the retailer is assumed to pay a xed-price of $65 per tape with
no inventory restrictions. In this case, the revenue-sharing terms re
ect the terms a retailer
would have faced if he had accepted revenue-sharing terms. There is little variation in both
the upfront fee and the portion of revenue kept by the retailer within each of the three
movie categories. The variation that does exist is variation across studios: in particular,
one studio charges an upfront fee of $10.30 rather than $8.30 for A and B titles. Much larger
variation is seen for minimum and maximum inventory requirements. The A and B titles
that are taken on revenue-sharing terms display lower minimum inventory requirements
and higher maximum inventory requirements, although the dierences are not signicant.
The inventory restrictions are often binding under revenue-sharing terms: between 34 and
43 percent of titles are taken at the minimum inventory level, and between seven and 13
percent of titles are taken at the maximum inventory level.
15The individual titles included in this dataset do not include adult titles, although I do observe total
monthly revenues across these broad categories.
10The last three rows of the top panel of Tables 4 - 6 give additional information about the
time at which a title was released. For example, \No. A Titles Released" re
ects the total
number of A titles released in the same month as the observed A title. I also observe the
number of A, B, and C titles released under revenue-sharing terms, or at sell-through pricing
levels in each month. These variables provide characteristics of titles, although these are
characteristics that are endogenously chosen by the upstream rm based on its expectations
about (time-varying) demand. Summarizing this information across stores according to the
pricing contract they accepted indicates that stores tend to choose xed-fee contracts on
titles released in months with a higher total number of title releases, the exception being A
titles released in months with many sell-through priced title releases.
The second panel of Tables 4 - 6 shows dierences in inventories, rental activity, and
prots for the two groups of titles. Inventories are approximately three times higher for
titles taken on revenue-sharing terms. Rentals are also higher for revenue-sharing titles,
but by a smaller amount than the increase in inventory, roughly 1.5 times. Two prices are
reported: rst, I report the average price of renting each title regardless of the length of the
rental period. Second, I report the average price divided by the average number of days in
the rental period. Data on the number of days in a rental period are reported by stores,
but the reporting method is not consistent across stores, and the data provide only a very
noisy measure of the length of the rental period. Nevertheless, I compare the measure of
price per day for the two groups of titles taken by each store. Using this measure of price,
stores set lower prices for titles on revenue-sharing contracts than for titles on xed-fee
contracts. Although the dierence is not statistically signicant, the absolute dierence
in price per day for the two groups of titles is greater than the dierence in total price;
stores often charge the same amount for a rental under the two contractual arrangements,
but allow for a longer rental term for titles under revenue-sharing contracts. Both retailer
and distributor prots are higher for titles under revenue-sharing terms than titles under
xed-fee contracts.16
16Another reason that retailers might choose revenue-sharing contracts has to do with risk. Perhaps
retailers choose revenue-sharing terms on titles for which demand is more variable. The ex-post implication
of the risk-reduction story is a small standard deviation for titles taken on xed-fee terms, relative to
titles taken on revenue-sharing terms within a store. This is present in the data; I allow for some retailer
uncertainty in the section on robustness check of the results. Note, however, that more risk is borne by the
upstream rm under revenue-sharing terms, which may not always be desirable. Retailers hold a portfolio
of many hundreds of movies from all studios, while an individual studio's portfolio consists of only a few
movies each year.
11If the contractual form associated with dierent store-title pairs were randomly assigned,
then computing the eect of revenue-sharing contracts would be straightforward, given the
level of detail in the dataset. One could estimate the average eect of revenue sharing on
retailer and distributor prots simply as the dierence between average rm prots under
xed-fee terms and average rm prots under revenue-sharing terms. Of course, contractual
form is not randomly assigned; retailers optimally choose contracts on the basis of some
unobserved heterogeneity. Thus, a simple dierence between the average \accounting"
prots for rms that chose xed fee and rms that chose revenue sharing is a biased estimate
of the eect of the contractual change. Furthermore, simply computing the dierence in
prots for the two groups of store-title pairs does not help us to understand why some
retailers are constrained by inventory minimums or maximums, or why upstream rms set
these inventory restrictions.
4 A Theoretical Model of Firm Behavior
In this section, I develop a theoretical model of rm behavior that incorporates the details
of the contractual environment facing video retailers, and rationalizes the use of inventory
restrictions. Using the data described above, I estimate the parameters of this model in
the next section. The primary motivation for developing the theoretical model is two-
fold. First, simple accounting measures of the eect of revenue-sharing contracts are biased
because of the endogeneity problems discussed above. An important role of the theoretical
model is to provide a complete description of the data generating process, including a role
for unobserved heterogeneity in rms' contract choices. Second, the data on their own do
not shed light on the reasons for implementing inventory restrictions in revenue-sharing
contracts. The second role of the theoretical model is to clarify the purpose of inventory
restrictions. The variation in these restrictions across store size and products, and the
lack of variation in the upfront fee and revenue-split, suggests that upstream rms pay
considerable attention to setting these restrictions.
4.1 A Single Downstream Market
To simplify discussion of the model, I rst consider a monopolistic upstream rm producing
one product that is sold in a single downstream market. I extend the model to many
downstream markets in the next section. Each unit of inventory of a particular title is
12produced at a small constant marginal cost. I specify a linear demand function for rentals
in the market as
Q = V   p (1)
where V is a measure of the title's appeal in this market, p is the market price, and Q is the
quantity of rentals in the market. I discuss alternative functional forms in a later section.
Let the marginal cost of producing a unit of inventory be denoted as l. Then the
maximum industry prot in the absence of price discrimination (and the prot achieved by
a vertically-integrated rm) is
max
fQ;Cg










where the market-clearing price, p, is given by the inverse demand function, Q is the market
supply of rentals, and C is inventory. The relationship between inventory and the quantity
of rentals is a challenging modeling issue. In this \base" model, I assume that rentals and
inventory are related as follows:
Q = min(V   p;C) (3)
where the quantity of rentals is limited by a technological constraint on the number of
rentals produced per unit of inventory, . Thus, for a given , the rm's inventory decision
determines the maximum number of rentals produced. In order to minimize cost, the rm
will not carry extra inventory, and Q will exactly satisfy the equation Q = C. Clearly, there
are several alternative assumptions one might make about this relationship; I believe this
assumption is a good approximation to reality for this industry.17 Under this assumption,
one can re-write industry prots in equation 2 as a function of C, and rst-order conditions










17In particular, one might worry that the relationship between inventory and rentals results from a more
sophisticated model of rental activity in which retailers choose not only inventory and price, but also stock-
out rates and the length of the rental period. The current model is equivalent to viewing one unit of
inventory (a video tape) as a box containing  rentals. Generalizations of the relationship between inventory
and rentals, and the robustness of the empirical results to these assumptions, are discussed in later sections.
13In a vertically-separated industry, however, a single rm does not directly choose inventory
for the industry. Instead, the upstream rm sets contractual forms and terms, and down-
stream rms choose inventory based on these terms. Under xed-fee terms, the upstream
rm sets a wholesale price, F. Under revenue-sharing terms, the upstream rm sets two
contractual terms: a revenue-sharing component, y, and an upfront fee per tape, u.
4.1.1 Retailers' Prot Maximization
In a vertically separated industry, downstream rms observe the contractual terms set by
the upstream rm, (F;u;y), select the optimal contract, and choose inventory to maximize
retailer prot. I assume that retailers observe market demand and compete with (N-1)
identical retailers in a Cournot fashion.18 The same relationship between inventory and the
quantity of rentals is assumed to hold for all retailers, so that  is assumed constant across
retailers and markets. Total revenues for retailer i are given by:










Retailer i maximizes prots by choosing a contractual form and inventory level, ci. The
indicator variable RS takes the value one if a revenue-sharing contract is chosen, and zero





i (ci) + (1   RSi)FF
i (ci): (5)
Given the optimal inventory decision of the retailer under each contractual form, one
can compute retailer prots under both contracts. The retailer then chooses the contractual













where F is the xed-fee or wholesale price per tape set by the upstream rm. Under
revenue-sharing terms, retailer i's prots are
18One could also introduce uncertainty into demand. I check the robustness of the results to the presence
of uncertainty on the parameter linking rentals to inventory () in a later section.
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where y is the percentage of revenue (less costs) remaining with the retailer, and u is the
upfront fee paid by the retailer to the manufacturer per unit of inventory under revenue-
sharing terms.19 I assume the downstream rm incurs no cost to produce  rentals from
each unit of inventory.
Solving for the equilibrium choice of ci, in which rms that choose the same contract

















where NRS denotes the number of competing rms choosing a revenue-sharing contract
and NFF denotes the number of competing rms choosing a xed-fee contract; note that
N = NRS + NFF + 1. The cost per tape for rm i is given by wi which equals F when a
xed-fee contract is chosen and equals u when rm i chooses a revenue-sharing contract.
In this equilibrium, rms only dier in their inventory choice if they also dier in their
contract choice.
Given the equilibrium choice for the level of inventory in equation 6, it is possible to solve
for the equilibrium choice of contract. Depending on the value of the demand parameters
and the number of downstream rms, it may be the case that: 1) only equilibria in which
all rms choose the same contractual form exist (symmetric); 2) only equilibria in which
rms do not all choose the same contract exist (asymmetric); or 3) both symmetric and
asymmetric equilibria in rms' choices of contracts exist.
In the case in which rms play either a symmetric pure-strategy revenue-sharing contract
equilibrium or a symmetric pure-strategy xed-fee contract equilibrium, equation 6 reduces
to c
i;FF and c























19Revenue-sharing contracts are often written as if revenue payments are made on the basis of revenue,
not revenue less costs. However, retailers are typically allowed to cover costs by selling inventory at the end
of the pre-determined rental period, or by keeping all revenues from rentals generated after the rental period
if the tape is not sold. These activities are not explicitly modeled here. Instead, I model the revenue-sharing
payments as being applied to revenues after costs have been covered.
15Retailers choose the pricing contract that maximizes their prots. Solving the retailer's
prot equation in the \symmetric contract" equilibria, one nds that retailers choose xed-
fee terms whenever V exceeds V , dened as
V (;;F;u;y) =





The retailer's contractual choice depends critically on the relative contract terms, F;u;y,
and the demand conditions,  and . Importantly, for a given set of contractual terms,
rms with higher draws of V accept xed-fee terms, while rms with low draws of V accept
revenue sharing. A higher xed-fee price, F, or a shorter technological \lifespan" of a unit
of inventory, , increases V , implying that retailers in markets with higher draws of V will
still accept revenue-sharing contracts. On the other hand, increasing the upfront fee, u, or
decreasing the percentage of revenues kept by the retailer, y, reduces V . Although the
contract choice is presented here in terms of the demand parameter V , one could rewrite
equation 8 in terms of  and view the contract choice decision as depending on the lifespan
of a unit of inventory, . Viewed in this manner, rms choose revenue-sharing contracts
when the lifespan of a unit of inventory is short. I will address this further in a later section.
4.1.2 The Upstream Firm's Prot-Maximization
The upstream rm takes the retailers' decisions as given and maximizes prot for a partic-











s (F)(1   Ti) j ;;N;V;T
(9)
where the probability that retailer i chooses revenue sharing is , and the probability that
retailer i chooses xed fee is (1   ). The term Ti is an indicator for whether or not the
retailer is technologically equipped to implement revenue-sharing contracts.20 If the rm
cannot implement revenue sharing, they can only choose xed-fee terms. The upstream
rm's prot when retailers choose revenue sharing is denoted by RS
s and its prot when
retailers choose xed fee is given by FF
s .
20Empirically, this is equivalent to whether or not a retailer is signed up with Rentrak. Exclusion from
Rentrak could result from the lack of computer hardware or software, or because a retailer is denied credit
with Rentrak.
16In order for the upstream rm to induce the downstream retailers to stock the same
level of inventory as a vertically-integrated rm, it would need to set (u;y) such that C
RS
from equation 7 equals C









The ability of the upstream rm to tax prots through y implies that the optimal u = uV I
for any value of y. Setting retailers' portion of revenue, y, equal to zero satises a zero-
prot condition for the downstream rms. However, setting y equal to zero will also induce
them to reject revenue-sharing terms in favor of a xed-fee contract. Thus, one expects
the upstream rm to set y > 0, such that the downstream retailers are at least as well
o as they would have been under xed-fee terms.21 Both the upstream and downstream
rms benet from revenue sharing because revenue sharing allows the rms to attain the
maximum level of industry prots. Thus, all rms can be made better o by these terms.
4.2 Many Downstream Markets
In the previous section, it is shown that revenue sharing eliminates the double-marginalization
problem by transferring inventory at u = uV I (given by equation 10) and taxing subse-
quent revenues. When the downstream market is perfectly competitive, the upstream rm
captures all rents under either contractual form. A situation in which xed-fee pricing
does not induce ecient inventory holdings in perfectly competitive downstream markets
occurs when multiple, heterogeneous downstream markets exist, but the upstream rm is
not allowed to charge dierent wholesale prices across markets. Consider the upstream
rm's prot-maximization problem in the absence of revenue sharing when M downstream
markets exist. The prot function is:
FF











First order conditions for equation 11 give the optimal wholesale price:





2 and y is, by
















The studio would like to charge a dierent F
m for each of the M markets, but is con-
strained to charge the same price to all retailers. The optimal F in equation 12 is a
weighted average of the set of F
m that would be charged in each market if perfect price
discrimination were possible, where the weights assigned to the individual markets depend
on their competitive conditions.
When multiple markets exist, it is possible that some markets understock and some
markets overstock inventory, relative to the ecient, vertically-integrated rm's inventory
choice. For example, consider two markets with many rms (N1 ! 1 and N2 ! 1).
Market 1 has V1 = Vl and market 2 has V2 = Vh, where Vh > Vl, and the marginal cost of
























Firms in the low-value market, market 1, understock because F is relatively too high, while
rms in the high-value market, market 2, overstock because F is relatively too low.
Under revenue-sharing terms, u = uV I. However, setting u optimally still depends on
V and N in the downstream market. Recall u from equation 10:






















18Note that u is a weighted average of the set of optimal u
m that the upstream rm would
like to charge in each individual downstream market. Similarly, y will be set to induce
retailers in some \average" market to accept revenue sharing.
Equation 13 illustrates the potential for both under- and over-stocking in individual
markets under revenue sharing, relative to the vertically-integrated rm's choice of inventory
in each market. Individual markets are dierentiated by two features: their size (Vm) and
their competitive conditions (Nm). Empirically, the size of a market could depend upon
the number of customers in the market as well as the appeal of the product in that market.
The competitive conditions are given by the number of (identical) retailers in a market, and
I assume the retailers compete in a Cournot fashion.
In order to understand the role of quantity restrictions used in revenue-sharing contracts,
I examine three cases. In the rst case, V varies across markets, but the number of rms in
a market is held constant, so Nm = N 8 m: This example is similar to the rst model of
Dana and Spier (2001), in which variation in market conditions is generated by uncertainty
in the demand conditions in a perfectly-competitive market, rather than by the existence of
multiple, heterogeneous markets. In this case, I nd that revenue sharing helps, but cannot
achieve the maximum level of industry prots when N is nite and demand conditions
are not perfectly elastic. A single pair of quantity requirements (a single minimum and
maximum for all markets) can increase the upstream rm's prots. In the second case, V
is the same across markets, so Vm = V 8 m, but the number of downstream rms varies
across markets. Again, it is shown that revenue-sharing is an improvement over xed-fee
contracts, but does not achieve the maximum potential level of industry prots. A single
pair of quantity requirements can be dicult to implement in this case. In the third and nal
case, both V and N vary across markets. In this case, revenue-sharing also increases the
upstream rm's prots, but still results in over- and under-stocking.22 Stipulating minimum
and maximum purchase requirements allows the upstream rm to further increase prots.
In addition, the upstream rm now benets by conditioning quantity requirements on store
size. I discuss all three cases in Appendix A. I show that the use of quantity restrictions
can reduce such ineciencies in inventory levels.23
22For the remainder of the paper, over- and under-stocking refer to inventory choices relative to the
vertically-integrated rm's choice of inventory, which maximizes industry prots.
23This may seem to raise the question of why we do not see quantity restrictions imposed under xed,
linear pricing contracts. The salient impediment to imposing quantity restrictions in the xed-fee contract is
a practical one: retailers on xed-fee contracts have the 
exibility to resell inventory to other retailers, and
195 Alternative Specications of Consumer Demand: Price, Availability, Func-
tional Form and Equilibrium Assumptions
The model of rm behavior presented here has focused on the use of contracts between up-
stream and downstream rms, and not on developing a complete method for analyzing the
nature of consumer demand in retail markets or especially retail markets for rental goods.
Understanding how to estimate consumer demand in these markets, including the trade-
os between price and availability in the downstream market, is clearly an important issue.
However, the focus here is on understanding the nature and eects of contractual arrange-
ments between rms in vertically-separated markets, and not on developing a framework for
modeling retail demand perse. Nevertheless, one worries whether or how the determinants
of contractual arrangements between upstream and downstream rms may be misstated if
consumer demand is misspecied. In this section, I consider three potentially important
complications for consumer demand; a later section will also examine the robustness of the
empirical results to alternative specications and assumptions.
5.1 Measuring Price in the Rental Market
An implication of the theoretical model presented here is that under revenue-sharing con-
tractual terms, retailers should set lower prices than under xed-fee contracts. As mentioned
in the discussion of Tables 4 - 6, there may be multiple dimensions of price in this market.
In particular, the retailer may adjust both the price of a rental and/or the length of the
rental period. In the empirical results that follow, I model the decision of a retailer as a
decision over the total price (i.e., he chooses the product of price per day and number of
days, but he does not choose both variables separately.) Thus, estimates of welfare gains
that are generated from price falls stand in for expected drops in the price of a rental as
well as expected increases in the length of the rental period.
5.2 Availability and the  Parameter
An issue that is related to the dierent components of price is the treatment of the lifespan of
a unit of inventory, denoted by the parameter . With respect to the model outlined above,
inventory under these contracts is not monitored or controlled by the upstream rm in any way. One of the
principle advantages of revenue sharing is precisely the ability to monitor inventory and ne-tune retailers'
inventory choices in doing so.
20two points should be made. First, one can easily consider the retailer's problem in terms
of both  and V within the current model. For example, see the contract choice equation 8




(1 y) . Thus, one can allow the retailer's
decision to be made on both  and V , allowing simultaneously for both heterogeneity in
demand conditions and uncertainty (from the retailer's point of view) in . I provide results
from estimating the model under these assumptions in the section on robustness tests.24
Second, one could explicitly allow for dierent intensities of inventory use under the
two contractual forms. Indeed, although a technological limit to the lifespan of a unit
of inventory certainly exists (tapes do break after a number of viewing), one worries that
retailers also in
uence the number of rentals per tape by endogenously choosing availability,
the length of the rental period, late fees, etc.25 When advertising the benets of revenue-
sharing contracts, Rentrak often highlights the ability to satisfy demand more quickly using
a larger inventory. In addition to the results of \base" model, I also provide results that
incorporate dierent 's under the two contractual forms as a robustness test for this eect.
26 Additional methodological advances for estimating demand systems in which both price
and availability are strategic variables of the retailer (i.e., allowing for the simultaneous
choice of both inventory and ) are left for future work.
5.3 Functional Form and Equilibrium Assumptions
One advantage of using linear demand of the form Q = V   p as in equation 1 is that
analytical solutions for retailers' inventory and contract choices are readily available. Gen-
eralizations of the demand curve are easily generated that have straightforward analytical
24A complication arises when allowing for uncertainty in  in estimation. For store-title pairs on revenue-
sharing contracts for which quantity restrictions are binding, equations 8 becomes a more complicated
function of V and , as outlined in Appendix B. I provide further discussion of this issue in the section on
robustness tests.
25For example, one might worry that a retailer chooses high copy-depth and low  for an action movie
because he expects that demand is very sensitive to early availability, but he chooses low copy-depth and
high  for a romantic drama, perceiving the renters of that movie to be less sensitive to early availability.
His problem is then more closely related to the literature on variable proportions, where the rm varies the
intensity of use for dierent substitutable inputs (here, time vs. inventory). Note however, that allowing for
variation in V (rather than ) has the attractive feature that the observed quantity restrictions make sense
even when all downstream markets are perfectly competitive.
26A related issue is the question of whether additional inventory can stimulate demand directly, perhaps by
reducing stock-outs or through a signalling mechanism (i.e., consumers observe larger inventory holdings for
a title and infer that it is a higher-quality movie.) If inventory does in fact stimulate demand, my estimates
of demand elasticity will be overestimated. In other work, I document that this eect is relatively small: on
the order of a two to three percent increase in demand for one additional tape, evaluated at the mean level
of inventory for A and B titles (Mortimer (2001)).
21solutions for retailers' inventory and contract choices when quantity restrictions do not
bind; however, such generalizations typically do not have analytical solutions when quan-
tity restrictions are binding. In the empirical estimation that follows, I use the base model
to generate moment conditions that relate observed contract and inventory choices to the
underlying parameters of the model. Nevertheless, I considered two alternative functional
forms that do have analytical solutions (under non-binding quantity restrictions). These
are Q = V (1   p) and Q = V1(V2   p). The rst specication allows for rotations of the
demand curve rather than shifts (as in the base model). The second specication allows for
both shifts and rotations of the demand curve. I had diculty estimating these functions
forms, and in particular, I could nd no convincing source of variation in the data that
might separately identify the two types of demand movements.27 Regarding the possibility
of multiple equilibria with respect to retailers' contract choices, the base model assumes
that unobserved retailers choose the same contract as the observed retailer in a given mar-
ket. In other words, the base model assumes symmetric contract choice equilibria for the
purposes of estimation.28
6 Estimation
This section describes the estimation procedures and relates them to the behavioral model.
The behavioral model gives specic predictions linking rms' contract and inventory choices
to the competitive conditions and demand conditions in their markets. Specically, these
predictions relate the technology parameter () and demand parameters ( and the param-
eters of the probability density function of V ) to rms' contract and inventory choices. I
use four principal equations from the behavioral model to generate a set of moment con-
ditions that summarize the relationships between predicted parameter values and observed
contract and inventory choices at the store-title level. Empirically, I dene a market as a
zip code area, with approximately 24,000 people and 2.6 video retail stores in the average
27An alternative functional form would be a demand curve with constant elasticity, such as Q = Kp
1
. I
do not estimate this because it constrains my estimate of elasticity to be at least one and does not generalize
the model or reduce the computational burden in any obvious way.
28The estimated parameter values do lie in a part of the parameter space that admits symmetric contract
choice equilibria, although they do not always like in a part of the parameter space that admits only
symmetric contract choice equilibria. One could estimate parameter values based on other equilibrium
assumptions (for example, one could estimate probabilities of alternative equilibria, or impose the assumption
that unobserved retailers choose a dierent contract than the observed retailer), but the assumption of the
base model seems the most intuitive.
22market.29
My sample covers approximately 30 percent of all video retailers in the U.S.; in a typ-
ical market, I observe 0.8 of 2.6 stores.30 As in the behavioral model, I assume that the
unobserved downstream retailers in a market are identical to the observed rm, and that
they choose the same contract as the observed rm in my sample.31 Data include the
quantity and price of rentals (q and p), contract choice (RS), inventory (c), cost per unit
of inventory (the upfront fee under revenue-sharing terms, u, or the wholesale price under
xed-fee terms, F), revenue splits (y), the number of retailers in each market (N), and a
set of demographic and store characteristics (X). I do not observe actual prices paid under
xed-fee terms, which could re
ect additional volume discounts or bonus inventory from
\copy-depth" programs.32 I denote the full set of data as Z = (q;p;RS;c;u;F;y;N;X),
where an observation is a store-title pair. Price is calculated as the average price over all
weeks and quantity is given by the total number of rentals over all weeks. The parameter
vector to be estimated is denoted by  = (;;;v;).
I construct six moment conditions using four equations from section 4 describing rm
behavior. Specically, I construct moment conditions from the technology equation, the
demand equation, retailers' contract choice equations, and retailers' inventory equations. I
estimate a set of parameters using generalized method of moments (GMM) to solve:













where  (;Zi) is the set of moment conditions and A is a weight matrix. The rst moment
29Imposing this market denition allows me to observe the number of competitors faced by dierent retail-
ers. I discuss more 
exible specications later in this section that would allow me to relax this assumption.
30Unfortunately, I do not observe characteristics of the unobserved stores (except for an indicator if it is
a Blockbuster Video store). In the \baseline" analysis, I assume that the unobserved stores are identical to
the observed store in my dataset. Occasionally, my sample includes two stores in the same zipcode area. In
these cases, I allow for dierent unobservable demand components for each store, so that the market demand
estimated for each store is correlated only through observable market characteristics. I also condition on
store observables such as store size and the mix of a store's product across movie types.
31One could consider generalizing the model to allow for alternative equilibria in which the unobserved
retailers in a market choose dierent contracts than the observed rm. As noted in the theoretical section,
multiple equilibria in the choice of contracts may exist. The issue of multiple equilibria arises in other
literatures as well, such as the entry literature, for example. The view here is that the best approximation of
the characteristics and decisions of the unobserved rms in the market are the characteristics and decisions
of the observed rm.
32I estimate the model under alternative reasonable xed-fee pricing assumptions, and the results do not
change signicantly. These alternative include giving retailers a twenty percent discount, or charging $70
rather than $65 per tape.
23condition is given by E(q c) = 0 and is generated from the technology equation (equation
3) of the behavioral model. The second moment condition is associated with the demand
equation (equation 1) from the behavioral model. Market level quantity, Q in equation 1,
is calculated empirically as the number of rms (N) multiplied by the observed quantity
of the representative store in the dataset (q). The intercept of demand, V , varies across
markets and across titles within a market according to the behavioral model. I allow for
both observed and unobserved demand shifters to aect the estimate of V . I assume that
V is distributed lognormal (X0;2




v   1). Thus, the second moment condition is E(pi + Niqi   g0(Xi;)) = 0:
The remaining four moment conditions use the retailers' supply and prot equations
(equations 5 and 6 respectively) to compute the conditional expectations of retailers' in-
ventory and contract choices. First, consider the conditional expectation of RS, which is
the probability that revenue-sharing terms are chosen by a retailer for a particular title.
The retailer prot equation predicts that retailers with high market valuations for a title
will not choose revenue-sharing terms. Specically, retailers with V > V (;;F;u;y) will





2vV exp [(lnV   X0)2]=(22
v)dV ) = 0, and comes directly from
the retailer's prot equation in the behavioral model.
Finally, retailers' inventory decisions are predicted by equation (6). The conditional
expectation of c again involves the unobserved V , so these three moment conditions are
based on the expectation of the lognormal distribution of V . The functions g1(X;) and
g2(X;) give the expectation of V after conditioning on market and store characteristics




 ))X RS] and [(c   1
(N+1)(g2(X;)  
F
 ))X (1   RS)].
If only one pricing contract were available, calculating the expectation of V for each mo-
ment condition would be straightforward, based on the assumption of a lognormal distribu-
tion for V . Conditional on retailers having a choice of contracts, however, the distribution
of V is truncated from below for titles taken on xed-fee terms, and truncated from above
for titles taken on revenue-sharing terms. The truncation point is equal to V (;;F;u;y),
which gives the conditional expectation of V in the fourth and fth moment conditions
respectively as
24g1(X;) = E(V j RS = 1;X) = E(V j V < V ;X)




g2(X;) = E(V j RS = 0;X) = E(V j V > V ;X)





where  denotes the standard normal cumulative density function.
The last moment condition uses the second moment of the empirical distribution of
inventory (i.e., it equates the observed c2
i and E(c2
i j X;).) I allow for dispersion in the
relationship between the quantity of rentals and inventory by admitting measurement error
in the observed inventory choices. That is, I observe c where
c = c +  (15)
and  j c  N(0;2
). The measurement error aects the calculation of this last moment
condition, since one must now account for the variance of the measurement error.33 Finally,
I denote the conditional expectation of V 2 as g3(X;), where g3(X;) = exp(2X0   22
v).







 where the payment per unit of inventory, w = uRS +F(1 RS).










































The weight matrix A is not chosen to minimize variance according to Hansen (1982). As
reported in the section on robustness tests, the results change only slightly when Hansen's
estimate of A is used. Here, A is chosen to ensure that the parameters  and  exactly
satisfy the rst two moment conditions. Thus, the estimation of these parameters is not
33The introduction of measurement error allows for dispersion in the number of rentals per tape (), but
requires that the source of this dispersion is exogenous to retailers' decisions. See the discussion of the 
parameter in the previous section and related robustness tests.
25aected by any misspecication of the additional moment conditions generated from the
retailers' rst order conditions. All standard errors adjust for correlations within stores and
titles, essentially allowing for store and title random eects. The construction of the weight
matrix and the calculation of standard errors for the estimated parameter values are both
discussed in Appendix B.
Two additional issues are worthy of discussion. First, in the structural model of rm
behavior, I assume Cournot competition between identical rms. Empirically, the measure
of competition is the number of video retailers listed in the phone book for a (zip code
area) market. In addition to adjusting for observable dierences in the total number of
video retailers across markets, I also allow the demand facing an individual retailer to be
aected separately by the presence of a local Blockbuster Video. Based on the facts of this
industry, I believe this captures the most important eects of competition across markets,
while limiting the computational burden.34
The second issue is the fact that inventory restrictions are binding for many of the
observed store-title pairs taken under revenue-sharing terms. The truncation point given
by V (;;F;u;y) in equation 8 applies when inventory is chosen optimally. Thus, when
a retailer is constrained by inventory minimums or maximums for a particular title, the
implied truncation point changes. I incorporate the correct truncation point in these cases,
and provide further detail on the truncation adjustments in Appendix B. I also address the
sensitivity of the results to the truncation adjustment in a later section.
7 Estimation Results
The GMM estimation is conducted separately for A, B, and C titles. Table 7 gives the
estimated parameters of the distribution of V using demographic and store characteristics.
Column 1 gives results from estimating the model for A titles. These indicate that store
characteristics, and store size in particular, are correlated with V . Comparisons across the
three types of movies indicate that store size has a relatively larger eect for B and C titles
34Clearly, one might worry that observing the number of video retailers in a market is not perfectly
informative of the competitive conditions in a market. For example, one may worry that despite observing the
number of rms in a market, unobservable heterogeneity in the strength of competition across markets may
still play an important role in rms' decisions. Introducing unobservable heterogeneity into the model may be
accomplished by re-writing the moment conditions as a function of Ri and specifying Ri = Ni+i. Allowing
for two dimensions of unobservable heterogeneity in the moment conditions (Vi and Ri) is computationally
more intensive, but is conceptually the same problem as the one solved here.
26than for A titles. Exposure to greater numbers of customers in the store may have a rela-
tively larger eect for these types of titles than for A titles, which receive more extensive
national advertising at both the theatrical and video release. Demographic characteristics
are only weakly correlated with the estimate of E(V ), although it is shown in later specica-
tions that greater numbers of people are associated with larger demand for all movie types,
median income is negatively correlated with demand, and areas that are more suburban
appear to have greater demand for A titles (as opposed to B and C titles, which are more
likely to be `art-house' types of movies).
Additional store characteristics include indicators for whether or not a store receives
more than ve percent of its total revenues from rentals of games, rentals of adult titles, or
sales of tapes (rather than rentals). The eects of these variables on demand is generally
not signicant, although stores that derive more than ve percent of their revenues from
rentals of adult product tend to have lower demand for B titles, and stores deriving more
than ve percent of their revenues from rentals of games are correlated with lower demand
for A titles and higher demand for C titles.
Although I do not have data from Blockbuster Video stores, I can identify how many
Blockbuster Video stores exist in any given zip code market. The results in Table 7 as
well as later specications indicate that the presence of a Blockbuster store in a retailer's
market has a positive eect on E(V ). Industry sources often identify the positive eect
as the result of spillovers from Blockbuster's extensive advertising campaigns; Blockbuster
increased advertising signicantly with the introduction of its own revenue-sharing agree-
ments in early 1998. This positive correlation may also re
ect endogenous location decisions
by Blockbuster.
The behavioral model excludes cross-title demand elasticities and assumes that rms'
prots are additively separable across products. I include three variables that capture
changes in the availability of product released by studios over time. These are: the total
number of A, B, or C movies released in the same month as a given title, as well as the
total number of such titles released under revenue-sharing contracts, and the total number
of such titles released under \sell-through" pricing contracts.35 The results indicate that,
35As noted earlier, \sell-through" titles are priced to encourage direct sales to consumers (typically in the
range of $20.00-$25.00). Examples of such titles are children's videos (i.e., Disney titles), and very successful
teen- or comedy-oriented titles, such as E.T., Something About Mary, or Blair Witch Project. Video retailers
often benet from sell-through pricing, since they are also able to purchase tapes cheaply.
27especially for A titles, an additional release in the same month under either revenue-sharing
or sell-through pricing terms is correlated with lower demand for a title.
Finally, the price coecient  from Table 7 indicates that a $1.00 increase in the price
of a rental would result in roughly 256 fewer rentals over the life of a movie for A titles, 213
fewer rentals for B titles, and 47 fewer rentals for C titles in the average market. Based on
the observed average number of rentals and observed average price, the estimated  yields
price elasticities for the average market demand curve of roughly -0.7 for A titles, and -0.5
for B and C titles. Price elasticities less than unity result from the fact that the rst-
order conditions of the upstream rm (the movie studio) are not used in estimation. Such
price elasticities are possible when downstream rms compete in a Cournot game without
imposing upstream monopoly. The fact that the elasticities are low is an indication that
video retailing is a relatively competitive industry.
8 Counterfactual Experiments and Welfare Analysis
Based on the parameter values in Table 7, I conduct several counterfactual experiments.
Table 8 presents results for A, B, and C titles from three such exercises. First, I consider
the eect of introducing revenue-sharing in its current form, relative to the situation in
which rms only use a xed-fee contract. Second, I consider the eect of removing quantity
restrictions from the current revenue-sharing contracts. Finally, I consider the eect of
switching completely to revenue-sharing contracts within the industry.
The rst four columns of Table 8 give predicted average levels of inventories, prices,
revenue-sharing take-up rates, and retailer and distributor prots based on the estimated
parameters of the demand system. The last column of Table 8 lists the actual values
constructed from the data for each of these variables. Comparing the rst column of Table
8 to the last column gives some indication of the goodness-of-t of the estimated behavioral
model. The portion of retailers accepting revenue-sharing terms is estimated reasonably
well, as is inventory. Price tends to be overestimated, and computed prots for A, B,
and C titles also appear to be over-estimated as a result. While these values give some
indication of the goodness-of-t of the estimated demand system, they cannot be used for
calculations of consumer surplus, and they do not account for the adverse selection problem
facing upstream rms as a result of retailers' ability to choose between contractual forms.
Conclusions about the relative eects of dierent pricing policies are drawn by comparing
28columns 1 - 4.
8.1 Introduction of Current Revenue-Sharing Contracts
The rst experiment considers the eect of introducing revenue sharing in its current form,
relative to the use of only xed-fee contracts. This is essentially what happened in the
industry in early 1998 when Blockbuster and other retailers began adopting revenue-sharing
contracts widely. Comparing columns 1 and 2 of Table 8 shows the eect of this contractual
change. For A titles, average inventory increases from 20.1 to 24.2 for the average store-
title pair, re
ecting the alleviation of the double-marginalization problem under xed-fee
contracting. I predict that approximately 40 percent of rms accept revenue-sharing terms,
and average price drops from $4.64 to $4.08. Average retailer prots increase by eight
percent, although distributor prots are one percent lower. Consumers benet the most, as
consumer surplus increases by 15 percent for A titles. Examining the B titles shows that
inventory again increases from 9.7 to 11.7, as 40 percent of retailers accept revenue-sharing
terms. The change is accompanied by a reduction in price from $3.47 to $3.01. Retailer
prots increase by 5.4 percent, and distributor prots are unchanged. Consumer surplus
increases by 13 percent. Similar results hold for C titles.
8.2 Elimination of Inventory Restrictions
Next, I consider the eect of inventory restrictions in the revenue-sharing contracts. Under
these conditions, retailers face the same monetary revenue-sharing contract terms (i.e., the
same upfront fee u and revenue split y), but are subject to inventory restrictions. The
results of this exercise must be interpreted carefully: one does not necessarily expect that
the distributor would optimally charge the same upfront fee and revenue-split in the absence
of inventory restrictions as they charge with inventory restrictions. In other words, while
I allow retailers to fully re-optimize in this scenario, I do not allow the same opportunity
for distributors. In the last exercise, empirical evidence suggests that xed-fee prices did
not change upon the introduction of revenue-sharing contracts. Thus, one might view the
absence of distributor re-optimization as a less serious concern than in the current exercise.
Even so, the lack of such re-optimization places limitations on our interpretations of the
29results.36
Under the assumption that distributors do not change the contract terms u and y, the
eect of eliminating inventory restrictions is seen by comparing columns 1 and 3 in Table
8. In the absence of inventory restrictions, more retailers accept revenue-sharing terms: 59
percent, 53 percent, and 51 percent for A, B and C titles respectively. With higher revenue-
sharing take-up rates, average inventories increase, and price falls relative to the current
environment. Retailer prot increases by one to three percent (across the three types of
movies), and distributor prot falls by the same percentage. Consumers gain the most from
the elimination of inventory restrictions and the associated higher rates of revenue-sharing:
consumer surplus increases by four to ten percent relative to the current environment.
8.3 Revenue-Sharing Contracts Only
Recently, one major studio began distributing products directly to retailers, managing the
distribution and retailer accounts internally. This has been viewed by some industry mem-
bers as possibly laying the groundwork for adopting revenue-sharing terms more widely
among retailers. Furthermore, Rentrak currently oers a few \output" programs in which
a retailer agrees to accept revenue-sharing terms for a bundle of titles. In this third exer-
cise, I consider the eect of moving to an environment in which only revenue-sharing terms
are oered, but retailers are not bound by inventory restrictions. Again, I do not allow
distributors to re-optimize, although it is unlikely that distributors would not change the
observed contractual terms of the revenue-sharing contracts. Thus, one must be cautious
when interpreting the results of this exercise.
If distributors do not change the terms of the revenue-sharing contracts, then the eect
of implementing revenue-sharing for all retailers is given by comparing columns 1 and 4
in Table 8. In this exercise, retailers cannot choose xed-fee terms. Inventories increase,
and price falls for all three classes of titles. Retailer prot decreases by ve to 15 percent,
but distributor prots increase by three to nine percent. Consumer surplus also increases
substantially, relative to the current environment.
36Simulations of the optimal wholesale terms (F;u;y) give estimates quite close to the actual terms, so
the results do not change much if we allow for reoptimization at the upstream level.
308.4 Welfare Eects by Store Types
Tables 9 and 10 examine the incidence of the eects of the alternative contractual arrange-
ments across retailers according to store size. Each of the ten panels corresponds to a unique
size category.37 Looking rst at the actual average levels of price and revenue sharing \take-
up" rates, one sees that price and total inventory levels increase with store size, while the
incidence of revenue sharing declines monotonically at larger store sizes. The model predicts
the same, although take-up rates of revenue-sharing contracts tend to be underpredicted
and predicted inventory levels vary less across store size categories than actual inventories.
Comparing the rst and second columns, one notices that small retailers benet more
from the introduction of the current contracts, with larger retailers benetting to a lesser
degree. Distributors are especially hurt by the ability of small downstream rms to choose
revenue-sharing contracts for poorly performing titles: for stores with less than $14,000 of
total monthly revenue, the upstream rm is actually worse o with the introduction of the
current contracts. For larger stores, however, both distributors and retailers benet from
the current menu of contracts, compared to a menu that includes only xed-fee contracts.
9 Robustness Tests
Tables 11 through 13 provide parameter values from estimating the model under various
alternative modeling assumptions as a check on the robustness of the base results, essentially
altering one assumption of the `base model' at a time. The tables provide results for A,
B, and C titles respectively; the rst column in each table repeats the results from the
appropriate column in Table 7 for comparison. Column 2 reports results using a weight
matrix as in Hansen (1982); the results change very little, although the estimated demand
elasticity for B titles increases from -0.48 to -0.63.
Column 3 reports results from estimating the model with two additional moment re-
strictions. The additional restrictions equate estimated accounting prots for retailers and
distributors with actual accounting prots (according to the same assumptions on the costs
of xed-fee contracts as used in Tables 1 - 6 and 8). The reason for including these moment
restrictions was to take advantage of additional information on rms' costs, especially the
cost of production borne by the distributor. The disadvantage of this strategy is that I
37These are the same store size classications used for setting quantity minimum and maximum require-
ments.
31potentially introduce misspecication of the market structure of the upstream market if
this market is not monopolistic. The results do not change much; in particular, the esti-
mate of demand elasticity is close to that computed in the base model. Some coecients
do change; the eect of a local Blockbuster Video appears to be much stronger across all
three movie categories. The additional moment restrictions are not rejected by the test of
overidentifying restrictions proposed by Hansen (1982).38
The last three columns provide robustness tests of the specication of the  variable, as
discussed in section 5.2. First, column 4 provides results from estimating the model with
dierent values of  for each contract type. This is done in order to address concerns that
revenue-sharing contracts are selected explicitly in order to increase inventory levels and
satisfy demand more quickly, intentionally lowering the eective . In fact, we do see a
stark dierence in  across the two contractual forms.39 The eects of a local Blockbuster
Video competitor and store size are now estimated to be much larger across all three title
categories. However, estimates of price elasticities are quite similar to the base model.
Finally, I also allow for uncertainty in the  parameter. In this case, we can interpret
variation in the relationship between rentals and inventory directly as variation in the  pa-
rameter, and thus I do not separately estimate measurement error in inventory.40 Analytical
results are not available in this case when quantity restrictions are seen to be binding; such
observations comprise nearly half of the total sample. Thus, I estimate the model both for
the subsample of observations for which the restrictions are not binding, and I also estimate
the model for the whole dataset under the assumption that those binding observations re-

ect inventory decisions that were in fact optimally chosen. I present the results for the full
dataset in column 5. Results that additionally allow for a distribution on the  parameter
under the assumption that inventory decisions were optimally chosen are presented in the
last column. Under these assumptions, the eects of many of the demographic and store
38The base model interacts the inventory choice equation with the observed contract choice, and thus uses
2k + 4 moment conditions to estimate k + 4 parameters where k is the dimension of X. The value of the
test statistic for the base model, which is distributed according to a 
2 distribution with k = 13 degrees of
freedom is 0.25, 0.18, and 0.04 for A, B, and C title respectively. The value of the test statistic when the
two additional moment restrictions based on accounting prots are also included is 0.38, 0.27, and 0.11 for
the three classes of titles, and is distributed according to a 
2 distribution with 15 degrees of freedom.
39The estimate of  reported for all observations is the average of the two 's, weighted by the number of
observations for each contractual form.
40This variation is what identies the variance of the measurement error in the base model, and I cannot
point to variation in the data that might separately identify these two dierent sources of dispersion in the
relationship between rentals and inventory.
32characteristics on demand are quite close to the base results. The eect of a local competing
Blockbuster Video, and the eect of store size is larger compared to the base results (much
like the results using separate estimates of  for the two contractual forms). The estimate
of elasticity is now close to unity for all three categories of titles.
Finally, Tables 14 - 19 provide results of the same counter-factual exercises as Table 8
for the estimated parameter values under each alternative specication in Tables 11 - 13.
Generally, the results are similar to the results of the counter-factual exercises using the
results of the base model. The results using demand estimates from columns 5 and 6 in
Tables 11 - 13 tend to estimate smaller eects of the current contracting environment relative
to xed linear pricing.41 Nevertheless, the estimates are still within a reasonable range of
the base estimates. Allowing for dierent 's based on contract choice, or allowing for a
distribution on  increases the relative eect of eliminating the xed-fee pricing contract for
all title categories (i.e., see column 4 in tables 14 - 19). Overall, however the results seem
robust to many dierent concerns one might raise about specic assumptions in the model.
10 Conclusion
This study considers the eect of a contractual change in the vertically-separated video
rental industry. The contractual change involves the introduction of revenue-sharing con-
tracts in addition to traditional xed, linear pricing contracts. The nature of the contrac-
tual change itself is unique: not only do downstream retailers have a choice of contracts for
each product, but they also face both minimum and maximum inventory restrictions under
revenue-sharing terms. Casual evidence indicates that this contractual change had an im-
portant and substantial impact on rms' inventory decisions. However, to my knowledge,
no theoretical study of revenue-sharing contracts considers a contracting environment of
this type, and the existence of both minimum and maximum restrictions presents a puzzle
for the standard analysis of revenue-sharing contracts.
The data in this study provide an unusually rich source of information on rms' decisions
in such an environment. An important component to the study is the development of a
model of rm behavior that rationalizes rms' contract choices and the existence of the
41Recall that these estimates re
ect the assumption that inventory choices are optimal, even for obser-
vations where quantity restrictions are observed to be binding. These results thus re
ect both the true
estimates from the model incorporating variation in  and misspecication of V
 in the contract choice
equation.
33inventory restrictions observed in revenue-sharing contracts. The model explains the use
of inventory restrictions on the basis of an upstream rm's inability to discriminate among
heterogeneous downstream markets when the upstream rm is constrained to oer the same
upfront fees and revenue-splits to all retailers. The structural model is estimated empirically
using a panel dataset of rms' decisions for a large set of products. Based on the estimated
parameters of the structural model, I conduct several counter-factual experiments. First,
I examine the eect of adopting revenue-sharing terms, and nd that total upstream and
downstream prots increase by as much as six percent relative to the use of xed-fee pricing
contracts. I also examine the potential eects of eliminating inventory restrictions and xed-
fee pricing contracts. I nd that downstream rms benet from the elimination of inventory
restrictions, but upstream rm prots decrease. Eliminating both the inventory restrictions
and the xed-fee contracts leaves the upstream rm's prots virtually unchanged from the
current environment and lowers downstream rms' prots.
The challenges of eciently supplying rms in vertically-separated industries is a long-
standing and important problem for both upstream and downstream rms, especially in
many retail settings. Some industries have in fact found that vertical integration provides
a better solution (for example, the automobile-rental industry). Many other industries use

exible buy-back policies or revenue-sharing contracts to transfer goods between manu-
facturers and retailers (such as the retail book industry and theatrical movie exhibition
industry, respectively). By making use of sophisticated software and monitoring technol-
ogy, the home video industry has created more 
exible ways of transferring goods from
upstream to downstream markets. By studying the contracts adopted in this industry, one
hopes to better understand the empirical eects of such contractual innovations on rm and
consumer welfare in these settings.
34Appendix A: Quantity Requirements with Additional
Sources of Heterogeneity
A.1 The Use of Quantity Requirements when V Varies
The revenue-sharing terms that induce the ecient level of inventory in each market are
given by u in equation 10. With multiple downstream markets, the best the upstream
rm can do is to set a single revenue-sharing contract, with terms given by equation 13. If
N = N in all markets, then equation 13 reduces to
u =






When N = 1, transferring inventory at marginal cost induces a downstream monopolist
to charge the correct price and carry the ecient level of inventory in the average market.
When N > 1, however, competitive retailers would choose to overstock relative to the
vertically-integrated rm's choice of inventory. Setting u as in equation 17 eliminates over-
and under-stocking for the market with V = E(V ) and N = N.42
If V varies across markets, equation 17 shows that one expects over- and under-stocking
in all but the average market. In particular, for markets with high draws of Vm, u will be
relatively too low, and rms in these high-value markets will overstock. For markets with low
draws of Vm, u will be set relatively too high, and rms in these markets will understock.
The under- and over-stocking problem under revenue-sharing terms is analogous to the
under- and over-stocking problem laid out in the discussion of xed-fee pricing in multiple,
heterogeneous downstream markets. As shown in this example, revenue sharing requires
a positive upfront fee in excess of marginal cost (u > l > 0) to avoid excessive price
competition, unless N = 1.
In order to reduce ineciencies in inventory levels, the upstream rm can set quantity
restrictions in the revenue-sharing contract. Consider the highest-value market, Vh. Each
market has N = N rms, and u has been set to induce the correct inventory levels in the
42Over- and under-stocking refer to inventory choices relative to the vertically-integrated rm's choice of
inventory, which maximizes industry prots.
35average market. Thus, u is given by equation 17. This u induces rms in the average
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The dierence between CVh(u) and C
Vh, and the extent of overstocking in the high-value
market, is given by
(CVh(u)   C
Vh) =
(N   1)(Vh   V )
2(N + 1)
(19)
The number of rms is the same in all markets, so the upstream rm can mitigate this
problem by setting a single maximum quantity for all retailers of cmax = C
Vh=N in order
to prevent overstocking in the highest value market. In fact, depending on the distribution
of V , the upstream rm may choose to set cmax < C
Vh=N, creating understocking in
the highest-value market, but reducing overstocking in other markets with Vm 2 [V ;Vh].
Similarly, if the lowest value market has V = Vl, the upstream rm can set cmin  C
Vl=N,
which is the minimum amount of inventory the upstream rm wants retailers to hold in the
lowest-value market. Recall that rms in the highest-value market pay too low an upfront
fee, and keep too high a percentage of revenue. Similarly, rms in the lowest-value market
pay too high an upfront fee, and keep too little of subsequent revenue. Thus, when setting
cmin and cmax, the upstream rm must take into account the potential eects of the quantity
requirements on rms' contract selections and possible exit from the industry. By now, the
upstream rm is solving a more complicated problem than the problem in equation 9. The
upstream rm's prot maximization problem, taking into account the ability to set a single
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36At this point, I have only addressed the use of a single pair of quantity requirements:
a uniform minimum and maximum quantity for all retailers. Clearly, this increases the
upstream rm's prots relative to revenue-sharing terms with no quantity requirements.
Empirically, however, one observes quantity requirements that vary by store size. Consider
dening store size in market m as Vm=N. Retail rms are assumed to be symmetric,
so all stores in market m are the same size. Recall that for all markets with Vm < V ,
understocking occurs because u is set uniformly. All markets with Vm > V overstock
inventory for the same reason. By conditioning quantity requirements on store size, the
upstream rm can induce the vertically-integrated inventory levels in each market because
store size is perfectly correlated with Vm. Only a minimum quantity requirement is necessary
for small stores, and only a maximum quantity requirement is necessary for large stores.
Essentially, conditioning quantity requirements on store size allows the upstream rm to
perfectly set C
m in each market.
A.2 The Use of Quantity Requirements when N Varies
In this section, I examine the use of revenue sharing in downstream markets where V = V for
all markets, but Nm varies across markets. Recall the optimal upfront fee for the upstream
rm to charge per unit of inventory given by equation 17:
u =













The upstream rm once again faces problems of under- and over-stocking because u
depends on N. In particular, markets with many rms, Nm > N, have \too much" com-
petition, and inventory will be overstocked in these markets. On the other hand, markets
with fewer than N rms have too little competition, which results in an under-supply of
inventory. In this case, it is dicult to set a single pair of minimum and maximum quantity
requirements for all rms. Setting a single quantity requirement can be dicult because
store size will be small in markets with large N (and overstocking), while store size will be
large in markets with small N (and understocking). Thus, it is possible that the maximum
37quantity requirement for all rms may be less than the minimum quantity requirement. Al-
lowing the upstream rm to condition quantity requirements on store size, however, solves
the problem. Once again, the upstream rm can achieve the maximum attainable industry
prots by setting quantity requirements by store size because store size is perfectly infor-
mative of Nm. Essentially, the upstream rm can perfectly discriminate across markets if
allowed to condition quantity requirements on store size.
A.3 The Use of Quantity Requirements when Both V and N Vary
In this section, I consider the upstream rm's problem when both V and N vary across
markets. Once again, setting a single u and y solves the inventory problem for the average
market, but induces some markets to understock and some markets to overstock inventory.
However, when both V and N vary across markets, it is less clear which markets will
overstock and which will understock because both measures are varying. For example,
consider a market with a low draw of V and large N. The low draw of V would induce
retailers to understock, while large N would tend to lead to overstocking. The osetting
eects may induce retailers to stock the correct amount.
Now the use of store size for conditioning quantity requirements is very useful. Recall
that store size was dened as V=N. Thus, when V does not vary, store size is perfectly
informative of N, and when N does not vary, store size is perfectly informative of V . Con-
ditional on store size, the upstream rm knows the optimal level of inventory exactly under
these conditions. When both V and N vary, store size is no longer perfectly informative of
the competitive conditions or size of a market. For example, two similarly-sized stores may
exist in markets with a high draw of V and many rms, or with a low draw of V and few
rms, respectively. The rst store in the high-value market, will tend to overstock inventory.
However, the second store will tend to understock inventory. Thus, it is no longer possible
to stipulate an exact level of inventory, conditional on store size. However, the upstream
rm can set bounds on inventory choices by setting minimum and maximum quantity re-
quirements according to store size. The use of both minimum and maximum requirements
arise because both V and N vary. Although it is not possible to perfectly discriminate
across markets when both V and N vary, the rm achieves the highest attainable level of
prots by setting minimum and maximum requirements in this way.
38Appendix B: Construction of Weight Matrix, Standard
Errors, and Truncation Adjustments for GMM Estimates
In this appendix, I describe the construction of the weight matrix, A, the calculation of
the standard errors for the parameters , and the truncation adjustments used in the GMM
estimates.
B.1 Construction of the Weight Matrix













where  (;Zi) is the set of moment conditions discussed in the estimation section, equation
16. In practice, the rst two moments, E(q   c) = 0 and E(p   g0(X;) + Nq) = 0 are
estimated separately, essentially giving more weight to the calculation of the parameters 
and , and requiring the parameters to t these equations exactly. This can be incorporated
in the GMM strategy by setting the weights corresponding to these moments arbitrarily
high. For each of the remaining moments, the weight matrix A is constructed optimally
using the two-step procedure outlined in Hansen (1982).
B.2 Calculation of Covariance Matrix
For a given weight matrix, Hansen (1982) shows that ^  converges in distribution to
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However, this estimate must be adjusted for both within-store and within-title correla-
tion. I assume there are no correlations across moment conditions. Thus, allowing for store
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where (s;t) denotes title t at store s, (s; t) denotes all other titles taken by store s, and
( s;t) denotes all other stores that took title t.
























where aij is the ijth element of ^  1. The practice of estimating the rst two moments sep-
arately corresponds to a GMM strategy in which the weight associated with these moments
is arbitrarily high. Specifying A as above re
ects this practice in the estimation of the stan-
dard errors. The covariance matrix for ^  is then estimated as (^  0A^  ) 1(^  0A^ A^  )(^  0A^  ) 1.
40B.3 Truncation Adjustments
Conditional on retailers having a choice of contracts, the distribution of V is truncated
from below for titles taken on xed-fee terms, and truncated from above for titles taken
on revenue-sharing terms, as indicated in the retailer's prot function in the behavioral
model. The truncation point is equal to V (;;F;u;y), which is given in equation 8 and
also shown here as
V (;;F;u;y) =





This gives the conditional expectation of V in the fourth and fth moment conditions
respectively as
g1(X;) = E(V j RS = 1;X) = E(V j V < V ;X)




g2(X;) = E(V j RS = 0;X) = E(V j V > V ;X)





where  denotes the standard normal cumulative density function.
The truncation point given by V (;;F;u;y) applies when inventory is chosen opti-
mally, and is derived by equating retailer prots (evaluated at the optimal inventory levels)
under each contractual form. When a retailer is constrained by inventory minimums or
maximums for a particular title, the implied truncation point changes. For store-title pairs
for which minimum or maximum inventory restrictions are observed to be binding, I denote
the truncation point as V 
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cmin if the minimum inventory restriction is binding
cmax if the maximum inventory restriction is binding
(23)
Just as in the calculation of V , the truncation point V 
m is derived by equating retailer
prots under both contractual forms, except that retailer prot under revenue-sharing terms
is now computed at cm rather than at the optimal inventory choice, c. Adjusting E(V ) to
41account for the implied truncation of the distribution of V when quantity restrictions apply
occurs as above in equation 22, but evaluated at V 
m rather than at V . Similar adjustments
are made to account for truncation when calculating E(V 2).
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44Table 1: Revenue-Sharing vs. Fixed-fee Contracts: A Titles, Dierences Between Stores for
the Same Title
Stores accepting Stores accepting
Revenue-Sharing (S.D.) Fixed-Fee (S.D.) T-stat of Di.
No. People ('000s) 23.32 (0.79) 23.83 (1.18) [ 0.8]
% Suburban 21.73 (1.28) 21.49 (2.02) [-0.2]
% Married with Kids 28.14 (0.21) 27.81 (0.23) [-2.3]
Median Income ('000s) 31.28 (0.57) 31.83 (0.88) [ 1.2]
No. Competitors 2.63 (0.08) 2.59 (0.08) [-0.8]
No. Blockbusters 1.06 (0.01) 1.06 (0.01) [ 0.9]
Store Size1 3.87 (0.48) 4.81 (0.27) [ 3.7]
Variety of Titles 659.73 (31.84) 590.28 (69.15) [-2.0]
% with Sales > 5 % 35.68 (7.22) 32.92 (11.78) [-0.4]
% with Adult > 5 % 32.96 (2.84) 31.55 (2.80) [-0.8]
% with Games > 5 % 42.15 (7.55) 48.50 (11.09) [ 1.0]
Copies 30.04 (9.91) 15.87 (7.18) [-2.5]
Rentals (Q) 471.71 (172.70) 485.50 (159.83) [ 0.1]
Price (P) 2.72 (0.07) 2.74 (0.07) [ 0.6]
Retailer Prot 370.36 (202.18) 380.21 (261.56) [ 0.1]
Distributor Prot 871.32 (312.26) 937.81 (453.87) [ 0.3]
Observations 23 23
An observation in this table is a title. For each title, mean store characteristics are com-
puted for the set of stores accepting each type of contract. The source of demographic data
is 1990 U.S. Census data. Data on competing retailers is gathered from 1998 and 1999
phone book listings.
1) Stores are categorized into 10 separate groups by monthly revenue size. Larger group
numbers correspond to larger store revenues.
45Table 2: Revenue-Sharing vs. Fixed-fee Contracts: B Titles, Dierences Between Stores for
the Same Title
Stores accepting Stores accepting
Revenue-Sharing (S.D.) Fixed-Fee (S.D.) T-stat of Di.
No. People ('000s) 22.94 (0.55) 23.69 (0.73) [ 2.0]
% Suburban 21.10 (1.38) 22.46 (1.27) [ 1.8]
% Married with Kids 28.21 (0.20) 27.86 (0.12) [-3.8]
Median Income ('000s) 31.34 (0.77) 31.58 (0.53) [ 0.6]
No. Competitors 2.66 (0.07) 2.56 (0.05) [-3.0]
No. Blockbusters 1.06 (0.01) 1.06 (0.01) [-1.0]
Store Size1 3.48 (0.38) 4.95 (0.38) [ 6.7]
Variety of Titles 698.81 (27.25) 608.88 (49.00) [-3.9]
% with Sales > 5 % 31.83 (5.76) 38.32 (8.70) [ 1.5]
% with Adult > 5 % 35.70 (3.50) 31.01 (2.53) [-2.6]
% with Games > 5 % 43.34 (5.92) 43.25 (7.80) [ 0.0]
Copies 12.98 (4.04) 7.29 (2.45) [-2.9]
Rentals (Q) 235.66 (106.84) 291.65 (124.32) [ 0.8]
Price (P) 2.68 (0.08) 2.74 (0.05) [ 1.6]
Retailer Prot 188.45 (117.36) 349.60 (292.61) [ 1.2]
Distributor Prot 424.91 (173.13) 437.47 (173.27) [ 0.1]
Observations 35 35
An observation in this table is a title. For each title, mean store characteristics are com-
puted for the set of stores accepting each type of contract. The source of demographic data
is 1990 U.S. Census data. Data on competing retailers is gathered from 1998 and 1999
phone book listings.
1) Stores are categorized into 10 separate groups by monthly revenue size. Larger group
numbers correspond to larger store revenues.
46Table 3: Revenue-Sharing vs. Fixed-fee Contracts: C Titles, Dierences Between Stores for
the Same Title
Stores accepting Stores accepting
Revenue-Sharing (S.D.) Fixed-Fee (S.D.) T-stat of Di.
No. People ('000s) 25.89 (7.08) 27.03 (7.33) [ 0.6]
% Suburban 20.12 (6.92) 20.01 (11.65) [ 0.0]
% Married with Kids 27.59 (2.12) 27.28 (3.64) [-0.4]
Median Income ('000s) 30.67 (3.02) 30.83 (4.71) [ 0.2]
No. Competitors 2.58 (0.42) 2.74 (0.92) [ 0.9]
No. Blockbusters 1.06 (0.05) 1.08 (0.12) [ 0.9]
Store Size1 3.76 (0.52) 5.16 (1.27) [ 5.7]
Variety of Titles 962.19 (156.20) 762.73 (189.94) [-4.6]
% with Sales > 5 % 31.69 (10.78) 33.78 (21.25) [ 0.5]
% with Adult > 5 % 46.90 (13.40) 42.61 (22.52) [-0.9]
% with Games > 5 % 43.10 (12.43) 50.59 (25.15) [ 1.5]
Copies 2.25 (1.43) 1.75 (1.23) [-1.5]
Rentals (Q) 24.97 (28.69) 33.71 (39.58) [ 1.0]
Price (P) 2.52 (0.20) 2.41 (0.48) [-1.1]
Retailer Prot 19.98 (28.15) -2.70 (79.71) [-1.5]
Distributor Prot 39.39 (50.38) 84.48 (79.65) [ 2.7]
Observations 1,055 991
An observation in this table is a title. For each title, mean store characteristics are com-
puted for the set of stores accepting each type of contract. The source of demographic data
is 1990 U.S. Census data. Data on competing retailers is gathered from 1998 and 1999
phone book listings.
1) Stores are categorized into 10 separate groups by monthly revenue size. Larger group
numbers correspond to larger store revenues.
47Table 4: Revenue-Sharing vs. Fixed-fee Contracts: A Titles, Dierences Between Titles
Within a Store
Titles taken on Titles taken on
Revenue-Sharing (S.D.) Fixed-Fee (S.D.) T-stat of Di.
Upfront Fee1 7.87 (0.86) 8.32 (0.89) [ 3.1]
Revenue Kept by Retailer1 0.45 (0.01) 0.45 (0.01) [ 0.5]
Minimum Inventory1 25.04 (16.14) 25.30 (14.49) [ 0.1]
Maximum Inventory1 56.54 (31.29) 50.91 (25.64) [-1.2]
% At Minimum 0.34 (0.34) { { {
% At Maximum 0.13 (0.20) { { {
No. A Titles Released 4.28 (0.50) 4.40 (0.70) [ 1.2]
No. A Titles, Rev-Share 1.67 (0.31) 1.86 (0.37) [ 3.4]
No. A Titles, Sell-thru 1.57 (0.27) 1.43 (0.32) [-2.7]
Copies 35.37 (27.54) 13.42 (12.29) [-6.2]
Rentals (Q) 585.67 (520.22) 398.53 (353.90) [-2.5]
Price (P) 2.73 (0.40) 2.74 (0.44) [ 0.1]
Price per day 1.84 (0.58) 1.88 (0.54) [0.4]
Retailer Prot 486.48 (555.44) 294.99 (455.14) [-2.3]
Distributor Prot 1,071.25 (959.18) 784.67 (728.00) [-2.0]
Observations 5,439 4,961
An observation in this table is a store. For each store, mean title characteristics are
computed for the set of titles taken under each type of contract. If a store chose revenue-
sharing (xed-fee) terms every time an A title was purchased, the store is not included as
an observation in the column containing information on xed-fee (revenue-sharing) terms.
1) For titles accepted on revenue-sharing terms, the averages of the upfront fee, revenue-split,
and the minimum and maximum inventory restrictions represent the actual fees paid by the
retailer (or adhered to, in the case of inventory restrictions). For titles accepted on xed-
fee terms, the averages of the upfront fee, revenue-split, and the minimum and maximum
inventory restrictions represent the revenue-sharing terms available to the retailer when
choosing between pricing contracts, but not actually paid. Under xed-fee terms, retailers
pay $70 per tape and face no revenue-split or inventory restrictions. A few titles are priced
for \sell-through," with the xed price per tape around $35.
48Table 5: Revenue-Sharing vs. Fixed-fee Contracts: B Titles, Dierences Between Titles
Within a Store
Titles taken on Titles taken on
Revenue-Sharing (S.D.) Fixed-Fee (S.D.) T-stat of Di.
Upfront Fee1 8.43 (0.62) 8.66 (0.48) [ 2.5]
Revenue Kept by Retailer1 0.45 (0.01) 0.45 (0.01) [-1.2]
Minimum Inventory1 12.92 (8.21) 13.03 (7.47) [ 0.1]
Maximum Inventory1 31.54 (17.07) 30.91 (15.91) [-0.2]
% At Minimum 0.43 (0.38) { { {
% At Maximum 0.09 (0.21) { { {
No. B Titles Released 5.02 (1.15) 5.17 (0.73) [ 1.0]
No. B Titles, Rev-Share 3.14 (1.12) 3.34 (1.03) [ 1.1]
No. B Titles, Sell-thru 1.86 (0.49) 2.03 (0.46) [ 2.1]
Copies 18.09 (15.24) 6.04 (5.61) [-6.3]
Rentals (Q) 386.99 (423.43) 228.43 (211.45) [-2.8]
Price (P) 2.73 (0.42) 2.72 (0.44) [-0.1]
Price per day 1.77 (0.62) 1.85 (0.57) [0.9]
Retailer Prot 351.32 (490.14) 256.32 (328.73) [-1.4]
Distributor Prot 690.95 (745.25) 361.80 (339.56) [-3.4]
Observations 5,194 5,243
An observation in this table is a store. For each store, mean title characteristics are
computed for the set of titles taken under each type of contract. If a store chose revenue-
sharing (xed-fee) terms every time a B title was purchased, the store is not included as an
observation in the column containing information on xed-fee (revenue-sharing) terms.
1) For titles accepted on revenue-sharing terms, the averages of the upfront fee, revenue-split,
and the minimum and maximum inventory restrictions represent the actual fees paid by the
retailer (or adhered to, in the case of inventory restrictions). For titles accepted on xed-
fee terms, the averages of the upfront fee, revenue-split, and the minimum and maximum
inventory restrictions represent the revenue-sharing terms available to the retailer when
choosing between pricing contracts, but not actually paid. Under xed-fee terms, retailers
pay $70 per tape and face no revenue-split or inventory restrictions. A few titles are priced
for \sell-through," with the xed price per tape around $35.
49Table 6: Revenue-Sharing vs. Fixed-fee Contracts: C Titles, Dierences Between Titles
Within a Store
Titles taken on Titles taken on
Revenue-Sharing (S.D.) Fixed-Fee (S.D.) T-stat of Di.
Upfront Fee1 7.83 (1.10) 7.72 (0.90) [-0.7]
Revenue Kept by Retailer1 0.49 (0.04) 0.51 (0.03) [ 3.6]
Minimum Inventory1 3.73 (3.58) 3.14 (1.66) [-1.3]
Maximum Inventory1 12.36 (8.04) 12.13 (5.11) [-0.2]
% At Minimum 0.41 (0.33) { { {
% At Maximum 0.07 (0.17) { { {
No. C Titles Released 70.50 (6.59) 73.78 (3.65) [ 3.7]
No. C Titles, Rev-Share 57.22 (4.62) 59.25 (3.30) [ 3.1]
No. C Titles, Sell-thru 36.30 (5.05) 37.92 (3.87) [ 2.2]
Copies 5.94 (6.97) 2.07 (1.04) [-4.7]
Rentals (Q) 125.09 (181.27) 54.01 (38.01) [-3.3]
Price (P) 2.65 (0.42) 2.56 (0.45) [-1.2]
Price per day 1.68 (0.64) 1.66 (0.61) [-0.2]
Retailer Prot 111.59 (196.34) 34.19 (80.66) [-3.1]
Distributor Prot 216.20 (347.56) 103.63 (55.03) [-2.7]
Observations 5,247 5,483
An observation in this table is a store. For each store, mean title characteristics are
computed for the set of titles taken under each type of contract. If a store chose revenue-
sharing (xed-fee) terms every time a C title was purchased, the store is not included as an
observation in the column containing information on xed-fee (revenue-sharing) terms.
1) For titles accepted on revenue-sharing terms, the averages of the upfront fee, revenue-split,
and the minimum and maximum inventory restrictions represent the actual fees paid by the
retailer (or adhered to, in the case of inventory restrictions). For titles accepted on xed-
fee terms, the averages of the upfront fee, revenue-split, and the minimum and maximum
inventory restrictions represent the revenue-sharing terms available to the retailer when
choosing between pricing contracts, but not actually paid. Under xed-fee terms, retailers
pay $70 per tape and face no revenue-split or inventory restrictions. A few titles are priced
for \sell-through," with the xed price per tape around $35.
50Table 7: Estimated Parameter Values from GMM Estimation
@ lnV=@X(1000) A Titles B Titles C Titles
People 0.5 0.1 0.4
(0.5) (0.3) (0.3)
% Suburban 38.9 2.1 -1.0
(37.0) (12.3) (10.3)
% Married w/ Kids 20.8 -8.6 -3.0
(129.9) (45.7) (148.9)
Median Income -0.0 -0.3 -0.9
(0.6) (0.4) (1.1)
No. Blockbusters 15.5 128.1 51.4
(17.5) (5.3) (42.0)
Store Size 2.8 110.2 16.8
(3.0) (1.7) (4.7)
No. All Releases -1.0 8.6 -0.1
(4.5) (3.2) (3.8)
No. Rev-Share Releases -315.9 -31.3 0.7
(8.9) (1.8) (3.4)
No. Sell-thru Releases -22.4 4.1 1.6
(8.8) (3.5) (2.9)
Sales > 5 % -3.3 -8.3 4.1
(17.2) (18.3) (27.4)
Adult > 5 % 5.0 -94.7 -2.4
(13.6) (12.8) (37.4)
Game Rental > 5 % -75.6 1.3 30.8
(17.8) (13.1) (9.1)
^  20.38 28.96 21.21
(0.07) (0.10) (0.12)
^  255.56 212.97 46.56
(0.27) (1.37) (0.42)
^ lnv 0.08 0.04 0.05
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
^  0.30 0.44 0.04
(0.26) (1.38) (0.16)
Price Elasticity -0.70 -0.48 -0.52
at Observed Q;P (0.001) (0.003) (0.005)
Observations 99,794 146,459 647,535
Standard errors in parentheses.
51Table 8: Counter-factual Experiments
Variable Current Fixed-fee No Inven. Rev-Share Actual
Only Restrict. Only
Panel 1: A titles
Inventory 24.24 20.08 26.94 31.19 24.00
Price 4.08 4.64 3.55 2.88 2.73
% Revenue-Sharing 39.91 0.00 58.55 100.00 53.04
Retailer Prot 901.58 828.85 927.87 859.74 393.30
Dist. Prot 1187.27 1203.72 1174.40 1228.81 911.55
% Change Ret. Prot -8.07 2.92 -4.64
% Change Dist. Prot 1.39 -1.08 3.50
% Change CS -14.74 9.62 30.31
Panel 2: B titles
Inventory 11.71 9.72 12.32 14.27 9.50
Price 3.01 3.47 2.79 2.24 2.72
% Revenue-Sharing 40.41 0.00 53.08 100.00 37.78
Retailer Prot 529.52 500.73 533.57 448.91 296.85
Dist. Prot 583.52 582.20 576.14 637.26 437.69
% Change Ret. Prot -5.44 0.77 -15.22
% Change Dist. Prot -0.23 -1.26 9.21
% Change CS -13.02 4.07 23.58
Panel 3: C titles
Inventory 3.62 2.84 3.85 4.23 2.94
Price 2.94 3.54 2.63 2.29 2.57
% Revenue-Sharing 35.29 0.00 51.10 100.00 47.14
Retailer Prot 111.33 93.31 115.09 101.67 55.25
Dist. Prot 113.20 118.75 110.53 120.27 102.45
% Change Ret. Prot -16.19 3.37 -8.68
% Change Dist. Prot 4.90 -2.36 6.25
% Change CS -21.46 6.58 17.21
52Table 9: Welfare Eects by Store Size (A Titles)
Variable Current Fixed-fee No Inven. Rev-Share Actual
Only Restrict. Only
Size 1: Monthly Rev < $4,000
Inventory 20.84 19.45 26.37 30.35 11.30
Price 4.18 4.58 3.47 2.81 2.59
% Revenue-Sharing 57.75 0.00 59.80 100.00 71.12
% Change Ret. Prot -8.60 2.85 -4.73
% Change Dist. Prot 9.64 6.68 10.18
Size 2: Monthly Rev > $4,000 and < $7,000
Inventory 23.73 19.96 26.84 31.07 11.97
Price 3.92 4.62 3.54 2.88 2.64
% Revenue-Sharing 5684 0.00 58.56 100.00 62.02
% Change Ret. Prot -9.26 2.26 -5.50
% Change Dist. Prot 6.28 3.24 8.25
Size 3: Monthly Rev > $7,000 and < $10,000
Inventory 25.18 20.34 27.29 31.68 14.79
Price 3.92 4.66 3.60 2.93 2.69
% Revenue-Sharing 50.94 0.00 57.81 100.00 57.87
% Change Ret. Prot -9.76 1.76 -5.77
% Change Dist. Prot 2.88 0.96 6.56
Size 4: Monthly Rev > $10,000 and < $14,000
Inventory 26.00 20.39 27.20 31.60 18.40
Price 3.92 4.67 3.60 2.93 2.73
% Revenue-Sharing 43.99 0.00 58.01 100.00 52.20
% Change Ret. Prot -8.94 1.51 -6.02
% Change Dist. Prot 0.52 -1.55 3.63
Size 5: Monthly Rev > $14,000 and < $18,000
Inventory 25.87 20.58 27.50 31.88 23.74
Price 4.05 4.68 3.60 2.94 2.76
% Revenue-Sharing 36.68 0.00 58.38 100.00 48.88
% Change Ret. Prot -8.21 2.37 -5.18
% Change Dist. Prot -0.73 -2.86 2.39
53Table 10: Welfare Eects by Store Size (A Titles, cont.)
Variable Current Fixed-fee No Inven. Rev-Share Actual
Only Restrict. Only
Size 6: Monthly Rev > $18,000 and < $25,000
Inventory 24.63 20.19 27.00 31.26 30.18
Price 4.18 4.65 3.56 2.88 2.80
% Revenue-Sharing 27.55 0.00 58.34 100.00 46.22
% Change Ret. Prot -7.20 3.23 -4.46
% Change Dist. Prot -2.41 -4.67 -0.30
Size 7: Monthly Rev > $25,000 and < $33,000
Inventory 23.11 19.61 26.35 30.44 38.55
Price 4.27 4.60 3.49 2.81 2.86
% Revenue-Sharing 19.54 0.00 59.15 100.00 43.83
% Change Ret. Prot -6.27 4.99 -2.47
% Change Dist. Prot -2.06 -5.59 -2.20
Size 8: Monthly Rev > $33,000 and < $40,000
Inventory 23.39 19.87 26.59 30.77 46.31
Price 4.32 4.63 3.54 2.85 2.86
% Revenue-Sharing 16.11 0.00 58.25 100.00 40.98
% Change Ret. Prot -4.66 6.13 -1.25
% Change Dist. Prot -2.07 -4.93 -2.36
Size 9: Monthly Rev > $40,000 and < $50,000
Inventory 23.32 20.13 27.08 31.32 56.20
Price 4.40 4.66 3.57 2.90 2.86
% Revenue-Sharing 13.00 0.00 59.06 100.00 38.04
% Change Ret. Prot -3.41 7.54 0.45
% Change Dist. Prot -2.47 -4.00 0.20
Size 10: Monthly Rev > $50,000
Inventory 20.80 18.79 25.54 29.35 77.71
Price 4.39 4.55 3.39 2.73 2.83
% Revenue-Sharing 8.18 0.00 60.57 100.00 32.31
% Change Ret. Prot -2.70 8.78 1.83
% Change Dist. Prot -1.85 -4.87 -2.37
54Table 11: Estimated Parameter Values from GMM Estimation, A Titles
@ lnV=@X(1000) Base Hansen Prots Dierent 's Not Binding Uncertain 
People 0.5 1.0 3.5 6.9 0.5 1.7
(0.5) (0.5) (0.7) (0.3) (0.4) (0.4)
% Suburban 38.9 72.2 31.7 40.2 28.3 -43.6
(37.0) (15.9) (25.5) (15.4) (19.3) (18.0)
% Married w/ Kids 20.8 27.6 -43.5 4.2 11.4 498.6
(129.9) (55.3) (97.6) (57.4) (75.9) (78.7)
Median Income -0.0 -0.1 0.6 0.1 -0.0 1.0
(0.6) (0.5) (0.8) (0.6) (0.5) (0.5)
No. Blockbusters 15.5 16.4 143.4 159.4 12.1 165.9
(17.5) (12.4) (16.9) (10.1) (11.3) (10.9)
Store Size 2.8 3.7 29.0 186.1 1.3 191.9
(3.0) (3.9) (2.1) (2.7) (2.7) (2.4)
No. All Releases -1.0 -0.5 -18.7 13.7 34.9 -25.8
(4.5) (4.3) (4.0) (4.0) (4.5) (4.6)
No. Rev-Share Releases -315.9 -328.3 -80.5 -164.9 -133.6 -67.5
(8.9) (10.9) (8.1) (7.8) (8.2) (8.0)
No. Sell-thru Releases -22.4 -15.9 -36.0 -29.8 -104.8 -52.7
(8.8) (8.8) (8.2) (9.5) (8.3) (8.5)
Sales > 5 % -3.3 -3.3 19.7 -69.2 -2.4 9.0
(17.2) (11.9) (14.9) (9.8) (11.3) (10.2)
Adult > 5 % 5.0 5.0 -51.6 1.8 2.7 1.4
(13.6) (16.5) (18.2) (12.5) (10.2) (10.2)
Game Rental > 5 % -75.6 -25.5 79.8 -83.3 -69.3 -38.6
(17.8) (13.1) (14.9) (10.8) (10.7) (10.0)
^  20.38 21.51 20.38 22.88 20.38 20.70
(0.07) (0.07) (0.09) (0.09) (0.08) (0.00)
^ ;RS { { { 15.88 { {
^ ;FF { { { 30.80 { {
^  255.56 258.43 228.54 234.77 215.89 180.57
(0.27) (0.10) (2.75) (3.18) (1.83) (3.06)
^ lnv 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.08 0.44
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.03)
^  (or) ^  0.30 0.14 0.26 0.19 0.33 0.004
(0.26) (0.09) (2.78) (3.17) (1.79) (0.39)
Price Elasticity -0.70 -0.69 -0.78 -0.76 -0.83 -0.99
at Observed Q;P (0.001) (0.000) (0.009) (0.010) (0.007) (0.017)
Observations 99,794 99,794 99,794 99,794 99,794 99,794
Standard errors in parentheses.
55Table 12: Estimated Parameter Values from GMM Estimation, B Titles
@ lnV=@X(1000) Base Hansen Prots Dierent 's Not Binding Uncertain 
People 0.1 1.9 1.2 0.1 0.6 2.0
(0.3) (0.3) (0.3) (0.2) (0.6) (0.4)
% Suburban 2.1 -18.9 -0.6 2.1 6.4 12.0
(12.3) (16.5) (13.1) (10.0) (49.0) (18.9)
% Married w/ Kids -8.6 9.6 -229.0 -5.2 -5.6 -15.8
(45.7) (58.7) (50.7) (87.1) (132.9) (84.2)
Median Income -0.3 -0.0 -1.5 -0.6 -0.4 -2.7
(0.4) (0.4) (0.3) (0.4) (0.2) (0.5)
No. Blockbusters 128.1 132.5 220.4 256.5 43.1 220.0
(5.3) (9.1) (7.0) (11.4) (6.3) (10.8)
Store Size 110.2 10.4 68.7 149.9 32.4 178.2
(1.7) (2.3) (1.3) (2.0) (2.2) (2.5)
No. All Releases 8.6 -0.4 8.8 4.8 -5.7 23.0
(3.2) (3.7) (3.1) (2.7) (2.9) (3.6)
No. Rev-Share Releases -31.3 -30.5 13.6 4.9 2.6 -5.7
(1.8) (3.4) (2.5) (3.9) (1.6) (2.9)
No. Sell-thru Releases 4.1 -55.0 -38.5 -2.1 12.1 -38.0
(3.5) (5.2) (4.1) (3.4) (1.7) (5.0)
Sales > 5 % -8.3 31.1 -1.0 -1.8 0.2 -32.0
(18.3) (8.8) (7.0) (11.6) (13.6) (9.7)
Adult > 5 % -94.7 11.4 48.5 -44.9 -15.1 -13.6
(12.8) (8.2) (7.3) (7.5) (23.0) (9.7)
Game Rental > 5 % 1.3 159.2 9.9 1.9 1.1 3.6
(13.1) (8.8) (6.9) (9.0) (5.7) (9.1)
^  28.96 30.52 28.96 32.28 28.96 29.15
(0.10) (0.15) (0.11) (0.11) (0.07) (0.00)
^ ;RS { { { 18.86 { {
^ ;FF { { { 40.43 { {
^  212.97 159.68 169.25 186.43 197.64 101.76
(1.37) (1.33) (1.62) (0.09) (0.30) (1.97)
^ lnv 0.04 0.09 0.08 0.01 0.01 0.53
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02)
^  (or) ^  0.44 0.29 0.00 0.59 0.66 0.07
(1.38) (1.40) (1.59) (0.17) (0.35) (0.06)
Price Elasticity -0.48 -0.63 -0.60 -0.54 -0.51 -1.00
at Observed Q;P (0.003) (0.005) (0.006) (0.000) (0.001) (0.019)
Observations 146,459 146,459 146,459 146,459 146,459 146,459
Standard errors in parentheses.
56Table 13: Estimated Parameter Values from GMM Estimation, C Titles
@ lnV=@X(1000) Base Hansen Prots Dierent 's Not Binding Uncertain 
People 0.4 2.3 0.5 7.3 3.7 4.9
(0.3) (0.8) (0.9) (0.5) (0.9) (0.7)
% Suburban -1.0 2.8 -0.9 -3.6 0.0 -0.6
(10.3) (27.6) (15.6) (35.7) (66.3) (22.2)
% Married w/ Kids -3.0 -4.5 -3.1 -36.3 -0.4 -52.0
(148.9) (36.5) (68.9) (96.3) (292.2) (115.6)
Median Income -0.9 -1.5 -0.9 -2.8 -0.5 -0.4
(1.1) (0.7) (0.4) (0.7) (0.5) (0.7)
No. Blockbusters 51.4 77.4 59.8 261.7 95.1 98.4
(42.0) (11.6) (16.8) (12.0) (35.0) (17.4)
Store Size 16.8 26.0 20.0 164.0 59.1 86.4
(4.7) (3.0) (2.8) (2.5) (9.4) (3.4)
No. All Releases -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 0.5 2.4
(3.8) (1.5) (1.1) (1.4) (1.6) (1.9)
No. Rev-Share Releases 0.7 2.8 0.6 -1.9 -0.0 -2.5
(3.4) (1.9) (0.8) (1.7) (2.9) (2.2)
No. Sell-thru Releases 1.6 4.2 1.5 1.8 4.6 6.7
(2.9) (1.3) (1.7) (1.0) (3.6) (1.3)
Sales > 5 % 4.1 23.7 4.3 2.6 -4.8 -44.8
(27.4) (12.6) (13.8) (17.4) (24.4) (14.3)
Adult > 5 % -2.4 -2.1 -2.3 -3.9 -0.4 15.1
(37.4) (21.6) (11.9) (14.6) (40.3) (15.8)
Game Rental > 5 % 30.8 66.6 32.0 122.3 88.0 81.0
(9.1) (24.4) (12.3) (12.6) (21.2) (13.9)
^  21.21 21.33 21.21 22.94 21.21 20.29
(0.12) (0.08) (0.05) (0.14) (0.08) (0.01)
^ ;RS { { { 14.84 { {
^ ;FF { { { 30.16 { {
^  46.56 43.04 51.69 31.76 39.68 21.40
(0.42) (0.17) (0.16) (0.42) (0.38) (1.01)
^ lnv 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.10 0.06 0.66
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.05)
^  (or) ^  0.04 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.60 0.20
(0.16) (0.24) (0.16) (0.29) (0.17) (0.06)
Price Elasticity -0.52 -0.56 -0.47 -0.76 -0.61 -1.13
at Observed Q;P (0.005) (0.002) (0.001) (0.010) (0.006) (0.053)
Observations 647,535 647,535 647,535 647,535 647,535 647,535
Standard errors in parentheses.
57Table 14: Counter-factual Experiments, A Titles
Variable Current Fixed-fee No Inven. Rev-Share Actual
Only Restrict. Only
Panel 1: Base
Inventory 24.24 20.08 26.94 31.19 24.00
Price 4.08 4.64 3.55 2.88 2.73
% Revenue-Sharing 39.91 0.00 58.55 100.00 53.04
Retailer Prot 901.58 828.85 927.87 859.74 393.30
Dist. Prot 1187.27 1203.72 1174.40 1228.81 911.55
% Change Ret. Prot -8.07 2.92 -4.64
% Change Dist. Prot 1.39 -1.08 3.50
% Change CS -14.74 9.62 30.31
Panel 2: Hansen
Inventory 21.24 17.14 23.52 27.23 24.00
Price 3.75 4.31 3.25 2.64 2.73
% Revenue-Sharing 39.21 0.00 59.67 100.00 53.04
Retailer Prot 741.09 670.57 767.56 722.90 393.30
Dist. Prot 1018.18 1027.75 1001.95 1039.18 911.55
% Change Ret. Prot -9.52 3.57 -2.45
% Change Dist. Prot 0.94 -1.59 2.06
% Change CS -16.68 9.28 29.97
Panel 3: Prots Included
Inventory 24.06 19.77 26.52 29.70 24.00
Price 4.15 4.80 3.69 3.05 2.73
% Revenue-Sharing 44.72 0.00 61.25 100.00 53.04
Retailer Prot 907.44 849.24 922.11 842.97 393.30
Dist. Prot 1167.03 1172.68 1159.41 1199.37 911.55
% Change Ret. Prot -6.41 1.62 -7.10
% Change Dist. Prot 0.48 -0.65 2.77
% Change CS -16.16 9.30 24.59
58Table 15: Counter-factual Experiments, A Titles cont.
Variable Current Fixed-fee No Inven. Rev-Share Actual
Only Restrict. Only
Panel 4: Dierent 's
Inventory 24.12 17.53 25.72 28.59 24.00
Price 3.87 4.71 3.57 2.97 2.73
% Revenue-Sharing 43.45 0.00 55.06 100.00 53.04
Retailer Prot 1432.37 1336.67 1445.25 1032.16 393.30
Dist. Prot 1089.81 1042.42 1087.56 1420.83 911.55
% Change Ret. Prot -6.68 0.90 -27.94
% Change Dist. Prot -4.35 -0.21 30.37
% Change CS -12.50 3.54 18.41
Panel 5: Restrictions Not Binding
Inventory 23.41 20.26 26.04 29.64 24.00
Price 4.46 4.95 3.88 3.19 2.73
% Revenue-Sharing 34.37 0.00 57.50 100.00 53.04
Retailer Prot 958.23 929.71 969.60 889.17 393.30
Dist. Prot 1209.50 1207.09 1191.45 1254.82 911.55
% Change Ret. Prot -2.98 1.19 -7.21
% Change Dist. Prot -0.20 -1.49 3.75
% Change CS -12.69 10.57 27.43
Panel 6: Uncertain 
Inventory 22.60 19.43 23.36 27.07 24.00
Price 4.64 5.22 4.36 3.49 2.73
% Revenue-Sharing 35.04 0.00 47.74 100.00 53.04
Retailer Prot 1590.40 1541.08 1597.67 1127.01 393.30
Dist. Prot 1166.43 1155.43 1152.47 1530.12 911.55
% Change Ret. Prot -3.10 0.46 -29.14
% Change Dist. Prot -0.94 -1.20 31.18
% Change CS -7.12 1.87 19.67
59Table 16: Counter-factual Experiments, B Titles
Variable Current Fixed-fee No Inven. Rev-Share Actual
Only Restrict. Only
Panel 1: Base
Inventory 11.71 9.72 12.32 14.27 9.50
Price 3.01 3.47 2.79 2.24 2.72
% Revenue-Sharing 40.41 0.00 53.08 100.00 37.78
Retailer Prot 529.52 500.73 533.57 448.91 296.85
Dist. Prot 583.52 582.20 576.14 637.26 437.69
% Change Ret. Prot -5.44 0.77 -15.22
% Change Dist. Prot -0.23 -1.26 9.21
% Change CS -13.02 4.07 23.58
Panel 2: Hansen
Inventory 8.02 7.44 8.45 10.52 9.50
Price 3.30 3.46 3.11 2.29 2.72
% Revenue-Sharing 15.46 0.00 29.05 100.00 37.78
Retailer Prot 384.79 379.36 387.50 338.02 296.85
Dist. Prot 451.21 447.77 447.25 479.01 437.69
% Change Ret. Prot -1.41 0.71 -12.15
% Change Dist. Prot -0.76 -0.88 6.16
% Change CS -6.06 4.61 32.06
Panel 3: Prots Included
Inventory 10.30 9.30 10.64 12.92 9.50
Price 3.46 3.74 3.33 2.51 2.72
% Revenue-Sharing 25.52 0.00 32.94 100.00 37.78
Retailer Prot 537.49 526.55 539.24 441.57 296.85
Dist. Prot 557.03 555.27 553.94 620.08 437.69
% Change Ret. Prot -2.04 0.33 -17.85
% Change Dist. Prot -0.32 -0.55 11.32
% Change CS -7.45 2.56 26.28
60Table 17: Counter-factual Experiments, B Titles, cont.
Variable Current Fixed-fee No Inven. Rev-Share Actual
Only Restrict. Only
Panel 4: Dierent 's
Inventory 10.98 8.16 11.62 12.99 9.50
Price 3.10 3.65 2.92 2.38 2.72
% Revenue-Sharing 33.88 0.00 41.05 100.00 37.78
Retailer Prot 683.85 639.38 687.96 482.71 296.85
Dist. Prot 502.61 485.92 501.68 669.42 437.69
% Change Ret. Prot -6.50 0.60 -29.41
% Change Dist. Prot -3.32 -0.18 33.19
% Change CS -11.35 2.81 18.25
Panel 5: Restrictions Not Binding
Inventory 10.81 9.69 11.38 13.92 9.50
Price 3.26 3.57 3.10 2.34 2.72
% Revenue-Sharing 27.68 0.00 36.42 100.00 37.78
Retailer Prot 469.82 462.32 471.45 427.13 296.85
Dist. Prot 574.15 576.91 576.61 608.84 437.69
% Change Ret. Prot -1.60 0.35 -9.09
% Change Dist. Prot 0.48 0.43 6.04
% Change CS -9.71 4.87 29.42
Panel 6: Uncertain 
Inventory 8.95 8.56 9.08 10.73 9.50
Price 4.43 4.59 4.31 3.36 2.72
% Revenue-Sharing 13.36 0.00 21.71 100.00 37.78
Retailer Prot 942.65 937.84 943.92 601.81 296.85
Dist. Prot 516.91 514.91 513.80 799.29 437.69
% Change Ret. Prot -0.51 0.13 -36.16
% Change Dist. Prot -0.39 -0.60 54.63
% Change CS -1.85 0.68 17.45
61Table 18: Counter-factual Experiments, C Titles
Variable Current Fixed-fee No Inven. Rev-Share Actual
Only Restrict. Only
Panel 1: Base
Inventory 3.62 2.84 3.85 4.23 2.94
Price 2.94 3.54 2.63 2.29 2.57
% Revenue-Sharing 35.29 0.00 51.10 100.00 47.14
Retailer Prot 111.33 93.31 115.09 101.67 55.25
Dist. Prot 113.20 118.75 110.53 120.27 102.45
% Change Ret. Prot -16.19 3.37 -8.68
% Change Dist. Prot 4.90 -2.36 6.25
% Change CS -21.46 6.58 17.21
Panel 2: Hansen
Inventory 3.30 2.59 3.52 3.86 2.94
Price 2.92 3.51 2.61 2.27 2.57
% Revenue-Sharing 35.03 0.00 52.07 100.00 47.14
Retailer Prot 102.54 86.54 106.16 93.35 55.25
Dist. Prot 103.43 108.08 100.79 110.10 102.45
% Change Ret. Prot -15.60 3.53 -8.97
% Change Dist. Prot 4.49 -2.56 6.45
% Change CS -21.07 6.79 17.21
Panel 3: Prots Included
Inventory 3.76 2.86 4.00 4.40 2.94
Price 2.79 3.42 2.50 2.17 2.57
% Revenue-Sharing 38.05 0.00 53.27 100.00 47.14
Retailer Prot 106.71 86.37 110.78 99.43 55.25
Dist. Prot 113.42 118.61 110.99 119.11 102.45
% Change Ret. Prot -19.07 3.81 -6.82
% Change Dist. Prot 4.57 -2.14 5.01
% Change CS -23.77 6.65 17.44
62Table 19: Counter-factual Experiments, C Titles, cont.
Variable Current Fixed-fee No Inven. Rev-Share Actual
Only Restrict. Only
Panel 4: Dierent 's
Inventory 3.07 2.39 3.20 3.52 2.94
Price 3.48 4.06 3.27 2.78 2.57
% Revenue-Sharing 34.01 0.00 45.71 100.00 47.14
Retailer Prot 188.85 179.19 190.39 135.11 55.25
Dist. Prot 101.84 99.18 102.20 148.74 102.45
% Change Ret. Prot -5.11 0.82 -28.45
% Change Dist. Prot -2.61 0.36 46.05
% Change CS -9.30 2.08 13.60
Panel 5: Restrictions Not Binding
Inventory 3.40 2.76 3.58 3.95 2.94
Price 3.15 3.72 2.87 2.47 2.57
% Revenue-Sharing 33.55 0.00 48.71 100.00 47.14
Retailer Prot 122.76 108.79 125.34 106.69 55.25
Dist. Prot 112.12 116.65 109.63 123.52 102.45
% Change Ret. Prot -11.39 2.10 -13.10
% Change Dist. Prot 4.05 -2.22 10.17
% Change CS -17.40 5.31 16.52
Panel 6: Uncertain 
Inventory 2.74 2.50 2.81 3.19 2.94
Price 4.34 4.71 4.15 3.41 2.57
% Revenue-Sharing 20.55 0.00 30.24 100.00 47.14
Retailer Prot 158.34 152.95 159.18 121.91 55.25
Dist. Prot 105.28 108.20 104.11 133.89 102.45
% Change Ret. Prot -3.40 0.53 -23.01
% Change Dist. Prot 2.78 -1.11 27.18
% Change CS -7.33 2.16 16.94
63